New Delhi. Through an international conference hosted in New Delhi June 9-10, India sent a clear, renewed message to the world community that it must shed its nuclear weapons for the sake of the present and future generations.

Nuclear weapons are not safe, no matter in whose hands they are. Worse, if they reach the hands of non-state actors like the jihadis, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh warned while opening the International Conference on “Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons.”

India renewed its 1988 call for nuclear disarmament that is global, universal and non-discriminatory. Rejecting the notion of regional and selective disarmament, he said that the objective could not be achieved through partial methods or approaches.

“The only effective form of nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons is global disarmament. Even today, the nuclear arsenals in the possession of the major powers are enough to destroy the world many times over. In this scenario it is not possible to ‘regionalise’ nuclear disarmament,” the Prime Minister told the conference organised by the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and the newly setup Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) here.

Noted defence analyst and former Director of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) Air Cmde Jasjit Singh heads the Centre.

Hosting the conference marked a dual anniversary: 20 years of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for Universal Nuclear Disarmament and 10 years of India testing nuclear devises and announcing to the world that it was indeed a nuclear weapons state, whether or not it was recognised as such.

The twin anniversaries did carry more than just a tinge of irony, but there was no contradiction.

With or without nuclear weapons, India has steadfastly adhered to the principle of universal nuclear disarmament.

If anyone saw contradiction in India turning nuclear, yet asking everyone to shed nuclear weapons, the Prime Minister “sought to set those doubts at rest. “India has no intention to engage in an arms race with anyone. Above all, India is fully committed to nuclear disarmament that is global, universal and nondiscriminatory in nature.”

“The pursuit of this goal will enhance not only our security but the security of all other countries,” he added.

But there were many more ironies in the international endorsements that brought about the conference. Supporting the Indian initiative wholeheartedly were four renowned American cold warriors – George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn – who belong to the Nuclear Security Project of the USA.

Invited to the conference, they regretted their inability to attend, but sent a joint message of support.

The tribe of cold warriors of all nuclear weapons states had rejected Rajiv Gandhi’s Action Plan. Of course, cold warriors were on both sides of the international political divide of the 1980s. Some called Rajiv’s idea a ‘fantasy.’

Today, with these four endorsing Rajiv Gandhi’s ideas – two decades af ter they were pronounced–yesterday’s ‘fantasy’ has become fashionable and politically correct. Many more are joining in vociferously, appreciably with good motives and particularly concerned at the developments in Pakistan which has indulged in both nuclear and missile proliferation.

The threat of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling in terrorists’ hands is a terror by itself, many of the participants observed at the conference.

Rajiv Gandhi’s India was generally dismissed as a large, populous, poor country, well-meaning in intent, but bent on moralising to the world.

That image changed a decade back: India was still large, populous and poor. But it went nuclear in 1998 under the prime ministership of Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee. With its economic reforms on-stream, and with its political, social and economic resilience, India weathered international criticism and economic sanctions.

India’s changed and changing status, while adhering to the principle of universal nuclear disarmament was underlined by an old India hand, US Senator Douglas Roche, former Chairman of the UN Disarmament Committee.

“The Western states dismissed Rajiv Gandhi’s plan,” he recalled. And, truth to tell, the changing governments of India lost heart that a country could be powerful and non-nuclear at the same time and turned India into a nuclear weapons state.”

India has not been formally acknowledged as a nuclear weapons state, but it has earned respect, and a place on the international high table.

This has been possible also because India has remained a responsible nuclear power right from the days of Mrs Indira Gandhi, who ordered the first test in May 1974 but declined to share nuclear technology with any country.

Dr Manmohan Singh drove this point home at the conference, saying that India was fully aware of its responsibilities as a nuclear weapon state. It had a declared doctrine of No First Use (NFU) and strict controls on export of nuclear materials and technology.

“Above all, India is fully committed to nuclear disarmament that is global, universal and non-discriminatory in nature. The pursuit of this goal will enhance not only our security but the security of all other countries,” Dr. Singh said.

It was in keeping with this approach that India recently submitted a Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

“We hope to stimulate a debate and promote consensus on the way forward. These are a set of practical measures for working towards the goal of a nuclear weapons free world. We do not wish to exclude other measures that may contribute to achieving this goal, nor do we hold that there is a rigid hierarchy among these steps and a specific sequencing for their implementation,” he noted.

“India is ready to add its own weight and voice to the global debate on nuclear disarmament with a view to crafting such a consensus on disarmament and nonproliferation. We need a collective approach anchored in a universal
partnership that is supported by non-governmental communities and public opinion,” said the Indian Prime Minister.

Senator Roche pointed out that although India had decleared itself a nuclear weapons state, “the vision of a nuclear weapons-free world is not dead in India.”

That being the case, he forcefully advocated that India should be “a proponent, if not the instigator, of this new world movement.” Senator Roche asked India to use its growing clout to reach out to other nations and be “a catalyst” in influencing the US and Russia, the two nuclear superpowers who between them possess 95 percent of the 25,000 nuclear weapons in the world, to “come down from the nuclear mountain”.

Similar support came from the Russian, British, Chinese, Australian and Canadian scholars. They generally felt that now is the time for a global initiative to arrest the nuclear arms race.

Progress, but not enough However, it was not as if everyone had become a dove and was ready for an instant nuclear disarmament. India was most conscious of this and this point was ably articulated by the doyen of the Indian strategic community, Mr K Subrahmanyam.

He said: In a world where 90 percent of nuclear arsenal is with two powers, US and Russia, it is natural for the US statesmen to be heavily preoccupied with mostly arms control reductions and further steps within that framework and keep a nuclthe intrusion.

We know the consequences.

The Pakistanis initially denied-lies being a part of their state culture always - and later tried to rationalize when caught.

There are only two chapters, 11 and 12, where Maj Gen V K Singh has expressed serious apprehension of the organizational functioning.

May be he was in an era where a particular set of people could not enforce and continue with the organizational culture. A certain decline seemed to have set in and that is why Tharakkan, an outsider, was brought in to head the organization.

There was a time when the Intelligence Bureau Chief and later, the RAW Chief, could meet the Prime Minister at any time. The hearsay is that Mallick and Kao used to brief the Prime Minister every morning. They did not need any appointment.

When Morarji Desai succeeded Indira Gandhi in 1977 after the Emergency, he did try to distance the RAW chief from himself, who was the legendary R N Kao, and asked him to go to the Cabinet Secretary first.

Three RAW Chiefs I served with also enjoyed a fairly decent equation with the higher political leadership.

To quote an incident, the Army and Naval Chiefs had complained to the Defence Minister about inadequate and ineffective functioning of RAW and its other outfits. A briefing cum presentation was planned in the Minister's office in April 1998.

This was attended by the the Minister, George Fernandes, as well as the then Defence Secretary. RAW was represented by the RAW Chief, three addl/spl secretaries, Billy Bedi and myself. The Minister and the Defence Secretaries were more than satisfied.

The inadequacies in fact were identified on the part of the Army and Naval Headquarters; there was no proper dissemination of the information given to them.

Even during the Kargil operations, despite the clear picture of Pakistani helicopters well inside the Indian side of LoC, some Indian generals in the northern sector kept on insisting that there were no Pakistani troops on the indian side but only 60 to 80 infiltrators.

The Pakistan President would have been the happiest with them.

The Indian Army is yet to say what impact this perception, ignorance, or mindset of a couple of generals at the command level had on the Kargil operations.

The K Subrahmanyam Committee, which looked into the Kargil War, did not go into the Army's operational details. I understand that he has mentioned that he was not aware of this mindset of the top army brass in the operational area.

Perhaps the Army should have a re-look, if only to ensure that mistakes at the command level do not happen ever again. Was it the system at the Army HQ which failed to convey the ARC reports to the Army Brass in the northern sector, or they deliberately ignored it so as not to own responsibility for the Pakistani intrusion?

And what was the cost?

REFERENCE TO SUBRAHMANYAM COMMITTEE

A lot has been talked about the Subrahmanyam Committee.

Sixteen meetings were held between the Committee and ARC and RAW from August 1999 to December 2000.

I quote relevant portions: No intelligence failures had been attributed on account of functioning of RAW and ARC. However, certain equipment inadequacies were highlighted such as:

(a) Satellite imagery resolution.

(b) All weather capability with sub meter resolution.

(c) Availability of UAVs.

(d) Better coordination.

Some of the observations of the Subrahmanyam Committee are relevant. It says in its report:

The Director, Intelligence Bureau (IB) did convey certain inputs on activities in areas under Gilgitbased FCNA (Force Commander Northern Areas) of Pakistan to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Director-General Military Operations (DGMO).

There is a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels. JIC reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. Of the 45 intelligence inputs generated between May 1998 and April 1999, only 25 percent went through the JIC.

A Kargil-type situation could perhaps have been avoided had the Indian Army followed a policy of Siachenisation to plug unheld gaps along the 168 km stretch from Kaobal Gali to Chorbat La... Such a dispersal of forces to hold uninhabited territory of no strategic value would have dissipated considerable military strength and effort though and would not have at all been cost effective.

"The alternative should be a credible declaratory policy of swiftly punishing wanton and willful violation of the sanctity of the LOC."

SPECIFIC TO KARGIL OPERATION

The Army HQ asked for photographic intelligence of the LOC in Oct 1998. After that no requisition was given by them. Only on 10 May 1999, a requisition was given to photograph our own territory. A number of missions were flown and I would like to mention the comments of the Chief of Air Staff on the operations, sent to Director ARC:

"I would like to place on record my sincere appreciation for the sterling work done by the ARC during Operation Vijay. The electronic and optical information provided by the ARC before and during the actual operations was of immense value to the conduct of air strikes.

The co-operation extended by your men in carrying out missions under difficult and demanding circumstances is an eloquent testimony to the excellent leadership and guidance provided by you to the organization.

I am confident that the coordination between our organizations achieved during the operation will continue in times to come."

Not only that there used to be nearly daily meetings with the DGMI or even with the Chief of Army Staff, Gen V P Malik.

I quote the Gen VP Malik as saying:

"I highly appreciate the efforts of ARC in making our tasks easier. But you will appreciate I cannot publicly acknowledge these contributions.

But I have no hesitation in admitting that it was with your organization's sterling effort that the Army could link up and correlate their operational plans and execute them timely and successfully, otherwise the causalty figures could have been much higher."

Even after my retirement whenever Gen Malik met me, he always complimented the efforts of the ARC.

Every organization develops its own culture. Some allow more freedom, which actually helps an officer, and an operative, to set the direction of his goals and objectives. As long as there is responsibility, this should be okay.

There are enough checks and balances in the form of National Security Council and the National Security Advisor, and more checks can only restrict the flexibility of the organizational functioning of intelligence bodies.

It may not be a wise idea to tighten further but ensure that what is in place is efficiently enforced.