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Organized as an aerospace defense branch, the
new service consolidates units, troops and systems
that once worked separately to keep the skies
above the country clear.
Designated Aerospace Defense (ASD), the branch
is subdivided into three sections: the space command,
the air and anti-missile defense command, and
the Plesetsk military space center.
According to ASD spokesman Colonel Alexei Zolotukhin,
ASD has “assumed responsibility for the missile
attack warning system, anti-missile defense, air
defense, space surveillance and satellite launch
systems."
All the way from ground to space
ASD is based on the space troops organization
and consolidates the following sections:-
- A missile attack warning system
- A space surveillance system;
- A military space launch infrastructure
- Air defense missile troops of the Air Force
- The aerospace defense unified strategic command
(earlier based on the Moscow missile defense
system)
The branch is subdivided into three sections:
the space command, the air and anti-missile defense
command, and the Plesetsk military space center.
In this way, all available information on a possible
aerospace attack and the control for engaging
both ballistic and aerodynamic (aircraft and cruise
missile) targets will be concentrated in one command
system.
ASD troops now control all air defense radar
stations, early warning radar systems and orbital
intelligence systems (both ground- and satellite-based).
Other facilities include S-300 aerospace defense
brigades and Moscow's anti-missile defense system
equipped with silo-launched interceptors of intercontinental
warheads.
Hodgepodge inheritance
The Aerospace Defense branch is another attempt
to do something with the Soviet legacy in such
interlinked areas as anti-missile defense, the
country's air defense, missile attack early warning
systems, space surveillance, and military space
infrastructure.
In fact, all these systems were established simultaneously
and partly complemented one another. Many facilities
to defend the Soviet Union from space were "unique
and unmatched by anything else": the response
measures were designed with special technology
and principles of combat application.
Now the operational philosophy of the armed forces
has changed. One can criticize specific points
but the general trend is simple: Russia is trying
to live within its means by integrating its forces
and using "all-purpose platforms."
It has been specifically noted that existing
systems still capable of being upgraded (A-135
anti-missile system of the Moscow industrial area)
should be interfaced with new weapons and information
systems to be aligned with the aerospace defense
system in the coming years.
The question is how it will all be integrated
in practice. It has often been argued, when testing
automatic battle management facilities, that some
or all systems should be integrated. Integration
programs so far have entailed providing two monitor
screens for one operator and thus displaying the
combat situations from two different systems,
not an automatic exchange of data between them.
The A-135 system is classified, but what is known
about its predecessor - (A-35M) - makes one pause:
developers of future synchronized mobile aerospace
defense systems are facing challenging problems.
Real and contemplated weapons
Under the weapons procurement program until
2020, 56 battalions in the armed forces are to
be equipped with S-400 air defense systems (four
battalions have already received the equipment,
another two to four will receive it by early 2012)
and ten battalions will received S-500 systems
(the program is in the first phase of its development).
The last system, it seems, will bear the main
burden of anti-missile duties. According to military
experts, the system will include a missile for
the exo-atmospheric interception of ballistic
targets. The S-500 system, according to plans,
will be deployed after 2015.
By 2015, incidentally, the Mints Radio Engineering
Institute (which has developed most of our early
warning radar) promises to roll out a fully prefabricated
radar unit called the Mars. It is a mobile version
of the Voronezh radar system now being adopted
in Russia's missile attack early warning system.
It is reasonable to assume that the two systems
(the S-500 and the Mars) are being developed in
tandem as a weapon and information means of anti-missile
defense.
The tortuous progress in heavy systems development
has already brought Russia's air defense to a
peculiar state. Unable to select a unified platform
for the country's, army and navy air defense systems
in the 1970s, the ministry purchased all three
and demanded "maximum unification" (which
was achieved only nominally because of the different
approaches to designs).
As a result, the army and air defenses are now
facing a decision between two design-different
but purpose-similar anti-aircraft systems. One
is the S-400, which has succeeded the "anti-aircraft"
S-300P, taught to intercept tactical ballistic
missiles. And the other is the S-300VM/BMD Antei-2500,
a derivative of the army's S-300V missile hunter,
which has been successful in hitting aerodynamic
targets. The logic is forcing these two systems,
for all their distinctions, to look increasingly
alike.
Current plans, in this class, provide for only
S-400s and Vityaz systems - the next generation
of medium-range surface-to-air systems, which
must supersede the earlier S-300Ps. No confirmed
plans for the army's heavy AD systems have been
announced, with just a few hints that available
S-300Vs will be upgraded to S-300V4s.
This shows that, on the one hand, Russia's aerospace
defense is only beginning to integrate its weapons
systems. On the other, the overall amount set
aside for rearmament (about 20 trillion rubles
for the next ten years), as seen against the background
of continued difficulties in the industry, often
compels the military to make simple decisions:
what to take and what to discard.
For the moment it is hard to say how much the
Antei anti-ballistic technology will be needed
for the development of the S-500. But, judging
from decisions made public, the focus on the Antei-Almaz
approach as a single platform in aerospace defenses
is becoming increasingly obvious.
(The author is RIA Novosti
military affairs columnist)
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