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That future wars will be short and intense is
well accepted by the military. Geostrategic factors
and the reality that conflict will take place
in a nuclear environment points to wars of limited
duration in which all elements of combat power
must be optimally used to achieve decisive results.
The fluidity of operations in the tactical battle
area demands quick decision making and swift deployment
and utility of response resources. Failure to
do so will lead to sub optimal utilisation of
combat resources and missing out on fleeting opportunities
which such conflicts bring about. This could well
lead to stalemate rather than outright victory
and in some cases even to suffering disproportionate
losses in battle. Two key elements for achieving
decision in the close battle are firepower and
manoeuvre.
Exploiting the third dimension through the rotary
wing is essential to achieving quick success in
the tactical battle area as it is both an element
of manoeuvre and a deliverer of firepower. Integration
of all resources within the tactical battle area
is thus critical to achieving battlefield success.
In high intensity battle, dual command and control
of resources is undesirable and could have potential
adverse consequences. While the land based resources
are integrated in a single command, attack and
utility helicopters which are part of army resources
in all modern armies in the West and also in the
armies of Pakistan and China are still being maintained
exclusively as Air Force assets in the Indian
military. While the Air Force may continue to
have helicopters based on its role, the Army must
have its aviation units equipped with attack and
utility helicopters in addition to the helicopters
used for reconnaissance which it currently holds.
They must be further be organised into aviation
brigades at the Corps level to fight the close
battle, both in defensive and offensive operations.
Why is it necessary for the army to have its
own aviation brigades? Is it simply a matter of
expansion and getting into the turf of a sister
service? The answer is an emphatic No. The concept
of fighting modern wars revolves around the all
arms combat team concept wherein all infantry,
artillery and mechanised forces resources are
placed along with all operational and logistic
support elements under one commander. In modern
wars, the rotary wing is part of this combat team
concept. All troops have to not only live and
train together, but must have complete understanding
of each other’s strength and capabilities
and a total comprehension and knowledge of ground
warfare. This is what is being done by US and
NATO forces currently engaged in Afghanistan and
earlier in Iraq. The Pakistan Army has already
integrated its attack and utility helicopters
as part of its army aviation and so has the Chinese
Army. India cannot afford to be lax on this score.
Fluidity of the battlefield imposes exceptionally
heavy demands on the Force wherein change in battlefield
tasks will occur in an ongoing battle. Such tasks
will be impossible to execute unless the Indian
Army’s aviation corps is equipped with attack
and utility helicopters. We cannot afford to fail
on this count.
There is a fear in some quarters that the growth
of army aviation would be at the cost of air force
assets. There is however no basis for such an
apprehension. All professional armies of the world
have their own fully equipped aviation arms, because
even the best air forces have severe limitations
in carrying out many operational tasks which are
intimately concerned with the land battle, especially
in the tactical battle area. The report by the
Kargil Review Committee was specific on this point
and recommended that Army Aviation have its own
attack and utility helicopters for the close battle.
While our Air Force is highly professional and
competent in performing its well-defined strategic
role, it should not be asked to do what the Army
is supposed to. The Air Force is a strategic asset,
best employed in depth areas.
Army aviation being equipped with attack and
utility helicopters is thus not at the expense
of the Air Force which has a major role to play
in suppressing enemy air capability, causing attrition
to and preventing the movement of his strategic
reserves, destroying his communication infrastructure
and command and control facilities among other
strategic tasks. But certain operational and logistics
tasks are best performed by integral resources
of the Army because of the intimate nature of
support and the need for immediate application
of aviation assets. It is not possible for air
forces to carry out such tasks, however efficient
they may be. Conflicts in various parts of the
world have further reinforced this, as it is only
integral aviation resources that would provide
the field force commander real-time battlefield
flexibility and consequent enhancement in combat
power.
The Indian Army must be given the capabilities
currently available to the Western Armies and,
more importantly, to both Pakistan and China.
As stated by India’s Army Chief, ‘Army
Aviation is the arm of the future and must be
appropriately equipped’. We cannot afford
to tarry any longer on this score. We are already
a couple of decades late.
The author is Additional
Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New
Delhi.
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