New Delhi. Ten years ago, in the summer months of 1999, the Pakistan army had launched an ill-conceived military adventure across the Line of Control (LoC) into the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and had threatened India’s territorial integrity. By infiltrating its soldiers in civilian clothes across the LoC and physically occupying ground on the Indian side, the Pakistan army had added a new dimension to its ongoing ‘proxy war’ against India.

Pakistan’s provocative action compelled India to launch a firm but measured and restrained military operation to clear the intruders. Operation ‘Vijay’ was finely calibrated to limit military action to the Indian side of the LoC and included air strikes from fighter-ground attack (FGA) aircraft and attack helicopters of the Indian Air Force.

Why did Pakistan undertake a military operation that was foredoomed to failure? Clearly, the Pakistani military establishment had become frustrated with India’s success in containing the militancy in J&K to within manageable limits and could not bear to see its strategy of ‘bleeding India through a thousand cuts’ evaporating into thin air. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government appeared to be inclined to accept India’s hand of friendship, in keeping with the mood of popular opinion within Pakistan, and committed itself to opening up trade, liberalising the Visa regime and encouraging people-to-people, cultural and sports contacts.

Though it did not feature in so many words in the Lahore Declaration of February 1999, the acceptance of the concept of the LoC as a permanent border between India and Pakistan was gaining currency.

It was in such a scenario that in an act more of desperation than strategic planning, the Pakistan army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate decided to launch an organised intrusion into the militarily vacant remote areas of the Kargil district to once again to somehow ignite the spark of militancy and gain ascendancy over the Indian security forces. Unfortunately for them, they failed miserably in this endeavour.

The strategic aim of the Pakistan army in engineering these intrusions under the facade of Kashmiri militancy was to provide a fresh impetus to the flagging Jihad and again attempt to focus international attention on the Kashmir issue. In the Dras, Mushko Valley and Kaksar sectors, the military aim was to sever the Srinagar-Leh National Highway (NH) 1A to isolate Kargil district and cut India’s lifeline to Leh, with a view to eventually choking supplies and reinforcements to Indian troops holding the Saltoro Ridge west of the Siachen Glacier.

Another military aim in these sectors was to open up a new route for infiltration over the Amarnath Mountains into the Kashmir Valley and the Doda region south of the Pir Panjal range. In the Batalik and Turtok Valley area, which adjoins the Siachen glacial belt, Pakistan attempted to establish a firm base with a view to eventually advancing along the Shyok Valley to cut the only road link to India’s Siachen Brigade. As an aim plus, the Pakistani army had also planned to physically occupy some territory on the Indian side of the LoC in Kargil district to use as a bargaining counter subsequently, particularly to seek an Indian withdrawal from Siachen Glacier.

The Indian military strategy was to immediately contain and limit the intrusions, prepare for and evict the Pakistani soldiers from the Indian side of the LoC and, finally, enhance surveillance, patrolling and deployment, where necessary, to ensure that the Pakistan army is denied the opportunity to launch such a venture again. The Army Headquarters realised that maximum available firepower would need to be employed, including that of the artillery and the Indian Air Force, by way of coordinated preparatory bombardment to reduce the combat potential of the enemy’s posts and break the enemy’s will to fight before infantry battalions could launch physical assaults to regain each position.

The Indian army launched some of the fiercest attacks in the annals of military history to take back high altitude mountain peaks from the aggressors and was completely unrelenting in its resolve to evict every intruder from the Indian territory. A demoarlised Pakistan army had to even disown its dead soldiers, particularly in the initial stages. Painfully for itself and their families, it refused to take back many bodies.

Facing an impending military defeat, General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistan army chief, is said to have pleaded with Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, to rush to Washington and request President Bill Clinton of the United States to broker a ceasefire. Pakistan then agreed to pull out its troops from Kargil unconditionally. As a face saving device, Pakistan’s widely anticipated pull back was couched in euphemistic terms. The artillery and the Indian Air Force, by way of coordinated preparatory bombardment to reduce the combat potential of the enemy’s posts and break the enemy’s will to fight before infantry battalions could launch physical assaults to regain each position.

The Indian army launched some of the fiercest attacks in the annals of military history to take back high altitude mountain peaks from the aggressors and was completely unrelenting in its resolve to evict every intruder from the Indian territory. A demoarlised Pakistan army had to even disown its dead soldiers, particularly in the initial stages. Painfully for itself and their families, it refused to take back many bodies.

Facing an impending military defeat, General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistan army chief, is said to have pleaded with Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, to rush to Washington and request President Bill Clinton of the United States to broker a ceasefire. Pakistan then agreed to pull out its troops from Kargil unconditionally.

As a face saving device, Pakistan’s widely anticipated pull back was couched in euphemistic terms. The Pakistan government announced that it would “appeal to the Kashmiri freedom fighters to pull out from their positions in Kargil,” – the same so-called mujahideen over whom it had repeatedly emphasised that it had no control! On July 26, 1999, the Indian army declared that all Pakistani intruders had been evicted from Kargil district.

Within India, the question arose as to was the country well prepared to face the challenge posed by the Pakistan army in Kargil?

India was prepared in the sense that the army had sufficient reserve battalions and artillery regiments to induct into the Kargil sector to stop further intrusions and, subsequently, to throw the intruders out and hand the Pakistan army yet another ignominious defeat. The air force had adequate combat potential to dominate the skies over Kargil and ensure that the Pakistan air force did not dare to come close to the LoC.

However, a large number of critical components necessary for executing the strategy that had been drawn up were either missing or held in insufficient quantities.

General V P Malik, the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), had been forced to make a chilling statement on national TV. In answer to a question regarding India’s war preparedness, General Malik had said, “We will make do with what we have.”

Adequacy of weapons now

It is well known that India had to go shopping for 50,000 rounds of Bofors 155mm artillery ammunition from South Africa even as the conflict was still on. If the army had long-range multi-barrelled rocket launchers (MBRLs) in service, it would have been possible to strike at Skardu and Minimarg in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) – the two command and control and logistics hubs of Pakistani forces there.

While Smerch Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRLs) have since been acquired from Russia, it is doubtful whether a sufficient number of 155mm artillery ammunition has been stockpiled as indigenous production has failed to take off. Also, artillery modernisation is at a standstill, as has been reported in these pages several times recently (see India Strategic, June 2009).

During the Kargil conflict the air force had done a creditable job of providing close air support to the army. However, it lacked the ability to strike accurately at narrow mountain ridgelines as it did not have the right precision guided munitions (PGMs). Some ‘dumb’ HE bombs were retrofitted with guidance kits and other innovative methods were used to overcome technological deficiencies, but these were not enough. Only Laser- and TV-guided bombs can provide the necessary accuracy.

Ideally, the IAF should be equipped with a specialised, dedicated ground strike aircraft suitable for the mountains. Such an aircraft would also cost only a fraction of the cost of multi-role aircraft such as Mirage-2000 or the MMRCA that is now being considered. Advanced attack helicopters (AAH), which are light and capable of operating in the Himalayan terrain, can also launch precision strikes and need to be added to the air-to-ground strike arsenal.

India still needs to acquire stateof- the-art military satellites and aerial and ground surveillance systems to guard against repetition of the Kargil intrusion or a similar situation.

There is an immediate need for military satellites with a sub-one metre resolution and multi-spectral (optical, infrared and radar photography) capability, so that they are effective both by day and night.

Satellite surveillance must be beefed up and an acceptable degree of redundancy achieved through the use of unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ground surveillance means such as battlefield surveillance radars (BFSRs) and un-attended ground sensors (UGS) in remote areas. Regular army aviation reconnaissance sorties need to be flown to detect intrusions and offensive military activity across the LoC, the AGPL in Siachen and the LAC with China while flying within our own territory.

Electronic surveillance means should be used to gain information about the plans and movement of Pakistan’s regular troops and socalled mujahideen mercenaries who include Pakistani ex-servicemen.

The IAF needs to supplement these efforts through its own reconnaissance flights using long-look optical systems (LLOS), infrared line scan (IRLS) and synthetic aperture radars (SAR). The IAF should acquire additional surveillance assets, where necessary, and should provide independent inputs to a national-level intelligence collection, collation, compilation, analysis, synthesis and dissemination centre.

Quite obviously, humint (human intelligence) means cannot be neglected and need to be appropriately strengthened. Only then will it be possible to develop a comprehensive border surveillance and intelligence acquisition plan to defeat a belligerent adversary’s nefarious designs. A responsive, real-time intelligence dissemination system must be instituted so that the concerned field commanders can be informed well in time to enable them to thwart infiltration and intrusion plans.

The most important lesson that India must learn from the Kargil imbroglio is that the inescapable requirements of national security cannot be compromised. Successive governments in Islamabad have sought with varying degrees of intensity to destabilise India, wreck its unity and challenge its integrity. In international politics, the policy of mutual friendship and co-operation with one's neighbours has to be balanced with vigilance.

A neighbour's capacity to damage one's security interests should never be underestimated, leave alone disregarded.

India must remain on guard against such sinister operations being launched in future by the vengeful and devious military leadership of Pakistan that has an illogical hate- India mindset with the mentality of primitive warlords.

It would be futile to hope that internal instability, international pressure or economic compulsions will dissuade the Pakistaniarmy from embarking on such ventures in future.

The Indian government must tell the Pakistani leadership that there is a limit to India’s patience and tolerance and that India will consider harder options if there is no let-up in the relentless proxy war being waged from across its western border by the Pakistan army and its world-famous, or notorious, sabotage agency the ISI.

The author is Director, Centre for Land and Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

(Pics Courtesy : The Author)