New Delhi. As we delve into witnessing warfare in the age of globalisation, there is a perceptible tapering of existent boundaries between soldiers and non-soldiers and the chasm between warfare and non-warfare means being rapidly filled up. The arena of warfare has expanded and stands inclusive of political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and psychological spheres, in addition to the land, sea, air, space, and electronic spheres.

While underlining China’s concept of ‘unrestricted warfare,’ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui state, “If we want to have victory in future wars, we must be fully prepared intellectually for this scenario, that is, to be ready to carry out a war which, may be conducted in a sphere not dominated by military actions.” In fact, this could well be interpreted in furtherance to what Sun Tzu had stated in his seminal piece, Art of War, “In fighting, it is necessary to use non-surprise moves to gather strength and to use surprise moves to achieve victory. Fighting entails just surprise and non-surprise moves. There is endless change to the use of surprise and non-surprise moves.”

China defines ‘strategy’ as the analytical judgment of factors such as international conditions, hostilities in bilateral politics, military economics, science and technology, and geography as they apply to the preparation and direction of the overall military/war plan. Chinese military planning is swayed with the notion that if information superiority is ‘weak’, anti-information strategy technologies can make use of the weakness to find a turning point for countermeasures. Notably, China has witnessed a doctrinal transformation from ‘limited war under high-tech conditions’ to that of waging ‘limited war under conditions of informationisation.’

According to Ashley J Tellis, space has acquired a privileged position in the Chinese military thinking wherein it appears to be gravitating towards three broad conclusions: Firstly, China must develop the entire spectrum of capabilities required to exploit space in the manner necessary to advantage its conventional military operations against a wide range of potential adversaries. Secondly, China must prepare to deny space to superior adversaries who could otherwise use their vulnerable but sophisticated space systems to multiply the conventional military advantages they already enjoy vis-à-vis Beijing. And finally, the centrality of space to information dominance and the pivotal significance of information dominance for producing victory in war imply that a struggle for space control is inevitable and, consequently, China must prepare itself for such rivalry by fully integrating space into its own military operations and, as required, developing its own space-related deterrent and war-fighting capabilities.

The Science of Information Operations (IO) is catching up rapidly in China and includes Basic Theory of IO, Applied Theory of IO and Technical Theory of IO. The People’s Liberation Army is gradually mastering the phenomenon of ‘plausible deniability’—an essential component in the terminology of cyber warfare. Significantly, there is no ambiguity in the manner in which the Chinese view information operations according to Ka Po Ng, who suggests the following:

• Intelligence operations, which include intelligence reconnaissance and protection.
• Command and control (C2) operations to disrupt enemy information flow and weaken his C2 capability while protecting one’s own.
• Electronic warfare by seizing the electromagnetic initiative through electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support.
• Targeting enemy computer systems and networks to damage and destroy critical machines and networks and the data stored on them.
• Physical destruction of enemy sources like information infrastructure such as command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) through the application of firepower.

PLA defence experts remain firm in their view by stating, “Whoever has control (or ‘hegemony’) over space, will also have the ability to help or hinder and affect ‘ground’ mobility and air, sea and space combat.” Furthermore, as far as network warfare deterrence is concerned, according to the March 2007 Liberation Army Daily, “We not only need to pay attention to raising our offensive operations capabilities in network warfare but also our defensive capabilities. We should make unremitting efforts to seek such a preemptive opportunity through developing network technology and systems.” China’s military space capabilities currently are manifested in five distinct areas:

• Space launch capabilities;
• TT&C network;
• Space orbital systems;
• Connectivity to military operations; and
• Counter-space technologies.

While discussing the significance of Information Warfare (IW) as the newest form of People’s War, Wei Jincheng opined that the technological revolution provided only a stage for confrontations. It is only when this revolution gets married with military operations, can it assume the characteristics of confrontation. Wei further stresses upon the integrity of the information systems and underlines the multi-dimensional, interconnected networks on the ground, in the air (or outer space) and under water, as well as terminals, modems and software as not only instruments, but also weapons. A people’s war under such conditions, according to him would be complicated, broad-spectrum and changeable with high degrees of uncertainty and probability, which requires full preparation and circumspect organisation.

Undoubtedly, IW is playing a serious role in the transformation of the PLA from a ‘mechanised’ to an ‘informationised’ force. In 2002, the PLA’s IW General Staff proponent, General Dai Qingmin, listed six forms of IW in the Chinese Journal, China Military Science: operational security, deception, computer network attack, electronic warfare, intelligence, and physical destruction. An instance of PLA’s significant transition to an informationised force was visible in August 2003, when Defence Minister, Cao Gangchuan told a meeting of municipal government personnel, the PLA General Staff, and the Beijing Military Region staff that ‘the defence build-up was aimed at gaining victory at IW.’

Crucially, in March 2003, military representatives attending the National People’s Congress (NPC) noted that IW units would soon be activated. These units had “already developed electronic jamming/bombardment weapons” capable of paralysing all enemy electronic systems including the Internet and military command systems.

The Chinese believe these weapons are more advanced than similar weapons in the US. Several trial units were already established, and a large portion of the budget has been directed towards advanced development of IW units. On November 4, 2003, President Jiang Zemin had urged the armed forces to build IW units to win in IW, where he emphasised, “New types of soldiers with new military theories are needed to do this.”

The PLA has placed high priority to command information systems. In its latest 2008 White Paper on National Defence, China has accepted further improvement in information infrastructure, basic information support and information security assurance of the integrated military information network that initially came into operation in 2006. Thereafter, progress has been made in the building of command and control systems for integrated joint operations, significantly enhancing the capability of battlefield information support. Besides, IT-based training methods have undergone considerable development; surveying and mapping, navigation, weather forecasting, hydrological observation and space environment support systems have been further optimised; and a number of information systems for logistical and equipment support have been successfully developed and deployed; and full-scale efforts in building “digital campuses” have begun in PLA educational institutions.

Within the PLA, the Shijiazhuang Army Command College, the Navy Command Academy, the Air Force Command Academy, and the Second Artillery Corps Command Academy met in July 2003 to work out an overall joint teaching programme for the three armed forces to share information resources and exchange experiences via the Internet.

While commenting on China’s space programme that tends to represent a major investment aimed at enabling Beijing to utilise space in expanding its national power, Ashley J Tellis asserts that the advancement in space technologies have become critical to the successful conduct of military operations as they enable Beijing to use its armed forces more effectively either because they permit better collection, transmittal and exploitation of information or because they support the development of new weapons such as responsive directed energy and other non-kinetic technologies.

China’s space policy goals could be characterised as simultaneously focused on securing economic and development benefits, enhancing national military capabilities, and procuring symbolic benefits that both aid regime survival at home and enhance Chinese prestige abroad.

China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test conducted in January 2007 was widely viewed as an aggressive demonstration of its technological prowess—in tune with a reality that for long has been an integral part of Chinese military doctrine—denial of information, strategic deception and the achievement of psychological surprise. It is amply evident that the Chinese view IW as an extremely attractive asymmetric tool that will ultimately enable them to overcome their relative backwardness in the realm of military hardware.

According to the 2009 Annual Report to the Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, the Pentagon stated that Beijing is rapidly improving its space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and communications capabilities, allowing for greater military support from space. In parallel, China is developing a multi-dimensional programme to improve its capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by potential adversaries during times of crisis or conflict.

Although China’s commercial space programme has utility for non-military research, it demonstrates space launch and control capabilities that have direct military application.

China conducted as many as 11 space launches in 2008, putting 15 satellites in orbit. Included in this number are four new remote sensing satellites: Yaogan-4, Yaogan-5, Huanjing-1A, and Huanjing-1B; the Shenzhou-VII manned spacecraft along with its accompanying small satellite, Banxing-1; three communications satellites; and, two meteorological satellites. Moreover, in April 2008, China successfully launched its first data relay satellite— TianLian-1.

According to PRC news broadcasts, TianLian-1 was initially tasked to support the launch of Shenzhou-VII manned space mission, increasing surveillance and control coverage of the manned spacecraft’s path from 12 percent to roughly 60 percent.

Besides, China has also begun development and testing of the Long March V rocket—the world’s largest.

Intended to lift heavy payloads into space, it will more than double the sizes of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) payloads that China can place into orbit. To support these new rockets, a launch facility near Wenchang on Hainan Island began construction in 2008. Besides, The Chang’e-1 lunar probe, launched in late 2007, continued to operate successfully with a controlled orbit. Chang’e-2 will launch in 2009 to conduct a lunar surface survey. China plans to land a lunar rover on the moon in 2012. The Chinese leadership continues to remain silent and maintains considerable opacity about the military applications of its space programmes and counter-space activities.

In 2008, numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the US Government, continued to be the target of intrusions that appear to have originated within the PRC. Although these intrusions focused on exfiltrating information, the accesses and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct computer network attacks. It remains unclear if these intrusions were conducted by, or with the endorsement of, the PLA or other elements of the PRC Government.

However, developing capabilities for cyber warfare is consistent with PLA military writings on the subject.

The Pentagon has acknowledged that the attacks by suspected PRC actors, including against India when in April 2008, Indian Government officials confirmed that its Ministry of External Affairs’ computer network and servers were the victims of intrusions that appeared to originate in China.

Besides, China is also hacking into defence supplies. As India plans a $ 9 billion package for its IT roadmap, the Chinese threat indubitably looms large over the same. Computer access and cyber warfare as a tool is well appreciated by the Chinese. Thus, needless to assert further that as China grows militarily and economically, its resultant strategies are all likely to expand especially in the cyber warfare arena. Cyber war in all probability would assume shape of being a key component and feature of any future conflict within Asia or beyond as we step into the information age.

The author is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.