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The Indian Army is similarly in the throes of
a parallel crisis regarding its role and relevance
in a post- nuclear context.
The issue is summed up in the graph below. The
histogram indicates the number of Divisions employed
in combat in each of India's Post-independence
military conflicts
The Tactical Phase.
It is obvious that till 1962 it was the tactical
phase of our military history. All that India
was capable of was the tactical employment of
two to three divisions only. This was the level
of force usage in the 1947-48 J&K conflict
as also in the 1962 war with China.
The Phase of Operational
Art. With the 1965 war, the Army graduated
to the level of Operational Art and used up to
12 Divisions in combat. It launched two Corps
sized offensives in Punjab and forced Pakistan
to recoil from Akhnur. It destroyed the Pakistani
First Armoured Division in a Land-Air conflict.
However, overall this cold start operation was
a stalemate that yet provided very useful learning
experience to our armed forces.
The Strategic Phase.
With the 1971 War over the liberation of
Bangladesh, the Indian Armed Forces had come of
age. India launched a text book Tri- Service campaign
that in just 14 days cut Pakistan in two and created
a new nation state. Over 93,000 POWs were taken.
It was a historic military victory and the peak
of Indian military power in conventional terms.
The Era of Mechanization.
The late 1970s and early 1980s were the
era of mechanization of our Army led by Gen Krishna
Rao, Gen Sundarji and Gen Hanut Singh. The Soviets
continued to heavily support our military buildup.
However the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 radically altered the Strategic scenario
in South Asia.
The Era of Low Intensity
Conflict. Pakistan began to support the
Khalistani terrorist movement in Punjab from 1983
onwards. This movement was decimated within a
decade and the Brasstacks Exercise helped to coerce
Pakistan into curtailing its support. However
in 1989 the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.
This relieved Pakistan of its two-front dilemma
and freed its XI and XII Corps for employment
against India. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1990
and the next year the Indian economy was also
close to collapse. Pakistan launched the Proxy
War in J&K the same year. A weak political
leadership and economic difficulties forced India
to respond in a purely reactive and defensive
manner on her own soil. Despite this, some two
decades down the line, the back of this terrorist
movement has largely been broken.
The Nuclearisation
of South Asia. In 1998, India and Pakistan
went overtly nuclear. This led to hubris in the
Pakistani Military-ISI complex which launched
the Kargil misadventure in 1999. India's resolute
and energetic response shook Pakistan. India confined
her response to its own side of the Line of Control
(LC), used upto two Divisions but massed effects
by extensive employment of artillery (100 tubes
to support a battalion attack) and air power.
However, Pakistan learnt the wrong lessons from
India's failure to cross the LC. It felt its conventional
military parity had deterred India from a trans-
border response. 95% of the weight of deterrence
in Pakistani military thinking, says Peter Lavoy,
shifted to the conventional level.
The next crisis in 2001-02 saw India mobilizing
its entire Armed Forces but doing nothing for
months before it pulled back its forces on half-hearted
assurances that Pakistan would scale back and
dismantle its terrorist Jihad infrastructure.
The Phase of Drift.
Almost 10 years later, Mumbai saw a zero
military response from India to yet another mass
casualty strike in the major metropolis of Mumbai.
Pakistani terrorists inflicted the 26/11 carnage,
and initially, the ISI propaganda outfit shamefully
tried to put the blame on Indian politicians.
Operationally, the Army was tasked to holding
the outer cordon while the Government mobilised
the National Security Guard (NSG). It took the
NSG three days to clear eight terrorists, mainly
because it had to ensure the safety oof hostages
on the one hand and because it had no access to
the layout of the hotels under siege. The live
media telecast complicated the operation as the
Pakistani handlers continuously updated the terrorists
about the movement of the Indian troopers.
The Army's commitments in J&K and the North
East are petering out and winding down. The State
Authorities in Kashmir are impatient to see the
Army out despite the clear risk of a slide back
due to the premature withdrawal of troops. The
Army is not keen to be deployed against the Naxals
in the Indian heartland as it will stymie its
cold start timings.
However, the Mumbai carnage unfortunately highlighted
our cold feet when it comes to using actual military
force. The Indian State spends close to 30 billion
dollars a year on its Armed Forces. What then
is their relevance to such sub-conventional Provocations?
From Mumbai to Munich?
The political authorities seem keen to
relegate the Armed might of the Services to irrelevance.
Routine statements are made that war is simply
not an option. Deterrence is primarily a mind
game and such well intentioned proclamations of
peace severely erode our deterrence posture and
the ability to deter sub-conventional attacks.
The Gaping Voids.
What is utterly confounding is the excruciatingly
slow pace of our arms acquisition process, mostly
due to negative politics played by politicians.
The entire Soviet era stock of capital equipment
is now due for replacement. Yet major arms acquisitions
have been delayed for years. The Comptroller and
Auditor General's Report has highlighted the following
glaring slippages :-
- 8th Plan (1992-97)
Just 5% of the planned acquisition of Tanks
and ICVs was carried out. This was the era of
a major systemic upheaval in Russia and our
own economy was close to collapse. The delays/
slippages were understandable.
- 9th Plan (1997-2002)
Despite a great upsurge in the Indian Economy
only 10% of the planned for acquisition could
be made. Possibly we were trying to complete
our economic modernization before embarking
on a military build up.
- 10th Plan (2002-2007)
Despite the Kargil and Op Parakram crisis
the percentage of equipment acquired fell woefully
short of planned targets. Thus :-
- Tanks:
Only 30% of planned acquisitions could be
completed.
- Infantry:
The Infantry that faces the Proxy war in
J&K and insurgencies in the North East
could acquire only 48% of the equipment
it had planned for.
- Mechanized
Infantry: Only 42% of the planned
acquisition could be affected.
- Artillery:
This arm has suffered most grievously since
the Bofors scandal, the entire mediumisation
and modernization of the Artillery has been
held up. Self propelled and Ultra Light
Weight Howitzers are being delayed inordinately
and the manufacture of ammunition for the
Bofors has just not taken off. Only 48%
of the planned acquisition could be completed.
- Air Defence
Artillery: Only 23% of planned acquisition
was done.
- Signals
Only 35% of the planned acquisition could
be done.
In fact, of the 250 items planned for acquisition
in the 10th Plan, only 96 items could be acquired.
This is opening up alarming voids in our defence
preparedness.
Before the 1962 debacle, for almost a decade
India's Defence Expenditure was reduced to just
between 1-2% of the GDP. This invited not just
the Chinese attack in 1962 but also the Pakistani
Invasion of 1965. Thereafter India had to spent
upto 3.5% of its GDP on defence for the next three
decades and it was the Soviet assistance that
enabled the historic victory of 1971.
For almost 10 years after the Kargil War, the
Indian Army has seen no meaningful combat. Is
this phase reminiscent of the pre-1962 era of
drift? An absence of any combat challenge can
induce a "peacetime Army syndrome" and
erode effectiveness and elan. There is an urgent
need for the Armed forces in general and the Indian
Army in particular to redefine its role and evolve
doctrines for Limited War against a Nuclear backdrop
that can deter/ prevent such sub conventional
provocations.
If India is unfortunately attacked with nuclear
weapons, the attacker must not be allowed to exist
and threaten us ever again.
India urgently needs to speed up its arms acquisition
process and field dominant war fighting capabilities
in South Asia. While India's defence budget is
just $ 30 billion, that of China is estimated
to be in the region of $ 139 bn.
This gives us an idea of the size of the capability
gap that is being opened inadvertently.
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