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Given the known lacuna in higher military management
in India of lack of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS),
coping with this imperative is difficult. The
assumption is that a CDS could help resolve any
inter-service matters. However, if Clausewitz’s
principle precept that if the nature of the conflict
being embarked upon is done correctly, then this
problem is reduced considerably.
At the outset, it must be pointed out also that
India wants and needs peace for its own economic
development. Shiv Shankar Menon, as Foreign Secretary,
told a select gathering at the Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses (IDSA) that “peace within
and around India is imperative for India’s own
development and that of the countries around it
for everyone’s benefit.”
But that unfortunately is not a view shared particularly
in Islamabad which attacks India through proxy
and terrorism.
There could be three conflict scenarios.
In the first, the outbreak of conflict in the
immediate aftermath of another 26/11-type attack
may be with the aim of inflicting decisive punishment
on the adversary. In such a case the weight of
the effort will be with the Air Force launching
‘surgical strikes’. The Army in such a case would
posture for deterrence purposes, so as to preclude
escalation. To this end, a repeat of the mobilisation
like Op Parakram would not be required. However,
the Army may make precautionary troop inductions
into vulnerable areas so as not to lose them to
enemy pre-emption. Air action will be to reinforce
a diplomatic offensive to coerce Pakistan to finally
acceding to India’s long standing demand of an
about-turn on its policy of supporting terrorists
as ‘strategic assets’. In fact, even foreign strategists
say that it is time that India made it clear that
‘Enough is Enough.’
The Second scenario could involve resorting
to pre-emption as part of policy of active defence
emanating from a deliberate decision taken at
the highest level. This may be a considered response
to prior provocative ‘Kargils’ and ‘26/11s’. The
scenario’s probability increases in case of any
implosion in Pakistani polity resulting in the
seizure of power by religious extremists. In such
a case, the military objectives of the three Services
in the war effort acquire significance.
The respective positions of the Air Force and
the Army, on occasion at variance, have been reflected
in many papers written on the subject since early
last decade. The general consensus is that the
lead service in the various phases of the conflict
may shift depending on the conflict circumstances.
In the early stage, the Air Force taking advantage
of its flexibility would be the lead Service,
as it is only an air force which can take the
battle to an enemy territory or an area of hostilties.
The Army and Navy would chip in with offensive
forces immediately available while the remainder
is mobilised. The Army’s early offensives being
launched under the air cover should be adequate.
With additional resources becoming available to
support the Indian Air Force (IAF), it would also
be possible for it to address its own and Army’s
concerns simultaneously.
The Navy would mount pressure in the Arabian
Sea to address Pakistan’s economy, war potential
in terms access to fuel and bring about the incidental
political effect of disruption of life in its
largest city. The Army promises to be off-theblocks
in double quick time in its Cold Start doctrine
as reported in a recent newspaper report: ‘The
(Cold Start) plan now is to launch selfcontained
and highly-mobile ‘battle groups’, with Russian-origin
T-90S tanks and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their
core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery
fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory
within 96 hours.’
The Air Force’s doctrine is known to have been
formed by study of the emerging pattern of war
over the past two decades. Therefore, gaining
air dominance along with destruction of enemy
infrastructure, particularly of military significance
such as transport, communication and power, would
be its primary objective in the opening phases.
Demands of net-centric and information war, where
India has made considerable progress, would be
fulfilled in a tri-service offensive in respective
domains. IAF has quietly worked for the past few
years to achieve air dominance capability.
The third scenario is one that was averred to
by the Army Chief as a ‘two- front’ one. The mediainduced
controversy around this misses the point that
this has been a preoccupation with the Army dating
to the Thorat report on organising defences on
the China front of the 1950s. It was central to
the defining engagement in India’s civil-military
relations in which the political head deferred
to General Sam Manekshaw’s persuasive case in
avoiding a two-front situation by attempting to
liberate East Pakistan while the passes towards
China were open. In the mid-1990s also, the threat
was acknowledged by one of India’s leading defence
analysts, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director
IDSA, who had advised in the context of the times
of straitened financial circumstance that China
be managed till the capability to cope is built
up. Anticipating the demands of a ‘twofront’ situation,
capabilities are, if slowly but steadily, being
put in place.
But a lot needs to be done in double quick time
if this two-front doctrine is to become credible
to our competitors and even likely allies. And
that means building up strength dissipated after
1989 following allegations of corruption in Bofors
gun acquisition.
The major difference in this conflict scenario
is that the national effort would have to be of
a higher order. This would require recourse to
the Blue Book, which was avoided even during Op
Parakram.
So as to prevent simultaneous strain on two fronts,
a call by the political head informed by the military-strategic
perspective would need to be taken early. Sticking
with the choice thereafter would fulfil the requirement
of selection and maintenance of aim, the foremost
principles of war. The resulting sequencing of
effort would help increase the military weight
being brought to bear. The lessons from the two
World Wars may be worth a recall on this score.
The Germans, the British and the US had to make
a grand strategic decision early on in the war.
The failure of the Germans to stick with their
decision, due to leadership and organisational
deficiencies of Hitler and his Reich, led in substantial
measure to their loss.
The nuclear overhang is now a permanent presence
in South Asia. While in Scenario One, it does
not come to the fore, it serves as a backdrop
to Scenario Two. Every effort of Pakistan would
be stay India’s conventional hand through foregrounding
its nuclear card. As earlier in Op Parakram with
posturing in relation to strike corps, the conflict
will throw up new lessons in nuclear signaling
for their exists no precedence yet of a wider,
yet limited, conflict between two nuclear states.
The earlier such episodes along the Ussuri and
at Kargil are instructive, but not very much so.
The third scenario would require a deliberate
effort at decreasing the visibility of the nuclear
card even as it is not hobbled.
The Chief’s reference to ‘two-front’ possibilities
has only and actually served a purpose in initiating
this discussion.
BUILDING CAPABILITIES
But then it is the delays in building up of capabilities
all across the Services which would have a telling
effect on realisation of both the single front
or two-front scenarios.
The Army continues to suffer from delays especially
in artillery modernisation and to an extent in
armour modernisation. Acquisition of network centric
capabilities in the Army has also not kept pace.
Since January 2008, the Ministry of Defence has
issued three global tenders for 155MM howitzers
for the mountains, the plains and self-propelled
guns for the deserts. Summer and winter trials
were expected to be completed last year but they
are still to commence. It was hoped that with
commercial negotiations proceeding smoothly, contract/s
could have been completed by the first half of
2010.
The artillery modernization includes off-the-shelf
purchase of 200 155mm/52-calibre mounted gun systems
to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another
614 such howitzers under transfer of technology
(ToT). The 17-tonne motorized howitzers will arm
40 regiments. Another major project includes the
purchase of 100 155mm/52-calibre self-propelled
tracked guns for five artillery regiments.
India is also looking to finalize the Rs 8,000
crores project to buy 400 155mm/52-calibre towed
artillery guns, which is to be followed by indigenous
manufacture of another 1,180 howitzers. The major
contenders are the BAE Systems, ST Kinetics of
Singapore and Israeli Soltam.
However, the bottlenecks in procurement may not
be cleared even by the new procedure promulgated
in 2009.
Another negative feature of procurement process
has been the inordinate delay in acquisition through
Fast Track Procedure (FTP). This was introduced
for the first time in DPP-2002 to meet the urgent
requirements emanating from operational imperatives.
Under FTP, the stages of procurement like issue
of Request for Proposal (RFP), technical evaluation
and trial evaluation were to be skipped to provide
a tested and established product.
A system under this procedure was to be provided
within the maximum time limit of 12 months. But
a performance audit of Army has revealed that
at least in eight cases, it has taken much more
time than mandated. For instance, weapons and
equipment for Para Security Forces, the demand
for which was initiated in September 2003 under
FTP, took almost 29 months to sign the contract
for the same in February 2006. Similarly, Electronic
Warfare System for the Army approved in the wake
of Kargil conflict took 75 months for the signing
of contract under FTP. In case of acquisition
of Extended Range Rockets it took over 40 months
for the FTP to be completed.
In the case of Remotely Operated Vehicle, Thermal
Imaging Stand Alone Sights for T-72 tanks and
UAVs purchased through FTP, the CAG’s audit report
has pointed out that there was no need to adopt
the FTP, and that normal procedure would have
sufficed. The need for acquisition of these items
existed since long and these could have been procured
without resorting to FTP.
UAVs have been under indigenous development since
the 1990’s but have had to be imported by the
three Services from Israel since 1996. FTP not
only compromised on competitiveness but in the
instant case, failed the intended purpose of acquiring
the capability within the shortest possible time.
The new DPP-2006 and 2008, which has been modified
again in November 2009, mandates that the application
of FTP will be approved by the Defence Acquisition
Council (DAC) and that contract should be signed
within five months of intimation and delivery
should be completed within three to 12 months.
Hopefully, with these timelines, FTP would live
up to its terminology and fulfill the purpose
of its formulation.
Some of the ills pointed out by the Comptroller
and Auditor General in our procurement system,
especially in case of the Naval equipment, are
illustrative of the lack of capacities and capabilities
for forging a modern force required to deal with
a two front situation. CAG has noted that “the
objective of inducting an aircraft carrier – Gorshkov
– in time to fill the gap in Indian Navy has not
been achieved. The cost of acquisition has more
than doubled to USD 2.3 billion in four years.
At best, the Indian Navy would be acquiring, belatedly,
a second-hand ship with a limited life span by
paying significantly more than what it would have
paid for new ship.”
Further, despite Indian Navy’s depleting force
level, the Ministry of Defence took nine years
to conclude a contract for the construction of
six submarines. The inordinate delay led to enormous
increase in the project cost to the extent of
Rs. 2,838 crore. And perhaps more.
The procurement procedure has had problems and
the technical evaluation conducted for a particular
type of submarine including the missile to be
fitted on-board was not comprehensive and reportedly
“biased” in favour of the vendor. Contractual
provisions have resulted in undue financial advantage
to the vendor to the minimum extent of Euro 58.20
million (Rs. 349 crore) besides other unquantifiable
benefits.
In addition, “five radars imported at a cost
of Rs. 24.88 crore could not be installed for
more than three to five years after their acquisition.
In the process the radars have not only lost 50
percent of their life but also remained unavailable
for operational purpose. The Navy failed to persuade
a foreign firm to replace unsuitable items supplies.
As a result, the expenditure of Rs. 385 crore
on their import was yet to yield any operational
benefit to the Navy.”
Similarly, for the IAF the long pending acquisition
of MMRCA and then bringing up the required strengths
of number of Air Force squadrons to the sanctioned
level will not be achieved in a hurry.
Therefore the conclusion is inescapable that
talking about two-front situations requires strong
capabilities, inducted timely, clarity of purpose
and a strong political leadership.
So far diplomacy and wisdom have prevented the
eventuality of a twofront scenario. But the geo-political
and geo-strategic environment is under flux and
the glacial pace of developing such force capabilities
would leave gaping holes in our security shield.
An extensive political-military interaction that
this necessitates in peace needs now to be pursued.
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