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In February 2010, the American ambassador in
Islamabad had said that the US Defence Department
was considering the sale of 12 unarmed drones
to Pakistan to encourage it to cooperate in the
war on terror. It is not beyond Pakistan’s technological
capability to arm these UAVs with air-to-ground
missiles for use in conventional conflict; something
which it has done in the past with the F 16s and
other systems despite undertakings not to do so.
The US has also offered 1,000 Laser guided bombs
to Pakistan to attack the Taliban terrorists from
the air in the NWFP and the FATA areas on Pakistan’s
western borders – the epicentre of international
terrorism.
In October 2009, Air Chief Marshal Rao Quamar
Suleman, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Air Force
(PAF), had accepted the first F-16 Block 52 aircraft
on behalf of his nation at the Lockheed Martin
facility at Fort Worth, Texas. The remaining aircraft
will be delivered in 2010. The total order, worth
US$5.1 billion, is for 12 F-16Cs and six F-16Ds.
When this transfer is completed, it will raise
the total number of F-16s in service with the
PAF to 54. The Pakistan Air Force received its
first F-16, in the Block 15 F-16A/B configuration,
in 1982.
Earlier, the US Defense Security Cooperation
Agency had notified Congress of a Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) to Pakistan of 115 M109A5 155mm self-propelled
howitzers as well as associated equipment and
services. The total value, if all options are
exercised by Pakistan, could be as high as $56
million.
This is not the first time that the US has offered
major arms packages to Pakistan, nor will it be
the last.
The United States had co-opted Pakistan as a
frontline state in its fight against communism
during the Cold War and armed it with Patton tanks,
F-86 Sabre Jets and F-104 Starfighters, among
other weapons and equipment. Despite strong US
assurances, all of these were used against India.
In the 1980s, Pakistan was the first country
in South Asia to get hitech war equipment, including
the F-16s, P3C Orion anti-submarine and shipping
aircraft, Harpoon missiles and Command, Control,
Communication and Intelligence (C3I) computers.
India had to follow by getting Mirage 2000 and
Mig 29 aircraft.
US-Pakistan cooperation was expanded further
when the former Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan.
In the 1980s, the CIA gave Pakistan huge quantities
of weapons for the Afghan Mujahideen, but much
of this inventory was diverted by Pakistan’s ISI
to its own army. These included shoulder-fired
Stinger surface-toair missiles, some of which
were recovered by the Indian Army from Pakistani
terrorists and mercenaries in Kashmir.
The US administration was under pressure by the
Congress to stop supplies to Pakistan because
of the diversion of the military equipment and
because Pakistan had developed nuclear weapons
despite promises to Washington. President George
H W Bush had to accede to the Congress and slap
sanctions against Islamabad, particularly after
CIA confirmed that Pakistan had indeed developed
nuclear weapons.
Post-September 11, 2001, the United States not
only ignored Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation
but also its emergence as the new hub of Islamist
fundamentalist terrorism. It also tolerated General
Musharraf’s dictatorial regime because it suited
US national interests in the war against terrorism.
The US designation of Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO
Ally (MNNA) in March 2004 had irritated Indian
policy planners because Indo-US relations had
just begun to improve. The “next steps in strategic
partnership” (NSSP) had been announced only in
January 2004 and India was looking forward to
a comprehensive engagement with the United States.
The Indo-US strategic partnership is now on a
firm footing, but developments such as the sale
of major conventional arms to Pakistan run the
risk of damaging the growing relationship.
The sale of conventional arms to Pakistan ostensibly
to fight terrorism has been criticised even in
the United States. A Congressional Research Service
(CRS) report has questioned the sale: “It (the
F-16 Block 52) incorporates advanced weapons and
avionics for air-to-air combat that appear unnecessary
for counterinsurgency operations. Less expensive
and less sophisticated aircraft such as attack
helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and combat
search and rescue aircraft would appear to have
greater utility in combating insurgents and other
non-state actors than supersonic fighter aircraft.”
It is another matter that Pakistan has some times
used fighter aircraft to strike targets on ground
in Swat and South Waziristan, selectively those
who have turned “rogue” and are not uner the ISI
umbrella any more.
The United States justifies arms sales to Pakistan
on several grounds.
Besides the need to continue to retain Pakistan’s
support in the hunt for al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists,
the United States realises the fragility of the
civilian regime in the face of Islamist hardliners
in the army, the ISI and the country.
It sees the Pakistan Army as a stabilising force
in a country that is being gradually Islamised
beyond redemption. The US feels that it must do
all that it can to keep the civilian regime in
power. It is also deeply concerned about Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons falling into Jihadi hands if there
is an Islamist coup.
Hence, the United States feels inclined to offer
some sops to satisfy Pakistan’s corps commanders
at regular intervals. The sale of eight Orion
maritime surveillance aircraft, the Phalanx gun
systems and the 2000 TOW anti-tank-cum-bunker
busting missiles falls in this category. Also,
India and Pakistan are among the largest arms
buyers in the world today and no US administration
can neglect the military-industrial complex. Most
of the weapons Pakistan get however are either
free or at nominal costs from the US and western
countries.
Though the sale of the Orion reconnaissance aircraft
will make things relatively more difficult for
the Indian Navy, the aircraft do not pose a direct
new threat to India. The proposed sale indicates
a US design to engage the Pakistan Navy in joint
reconnaissance and patrolling of the sea lanes
in the Gulf region by bolstering its capability
while a similar exercise is being undertaken with
the Indian Navy in the southern Bay of Bengal
and the Malacca Straits.
Clearly, the United States is planning to cooperate
with the Indian Navy through its Honolulu-based
Pacific Command and with the Pakistan Navy through
its Central Command. Such an arrangement will
also keep the Indian and Pakistan navies from
having to launch joint operations and undertake
search, seizure and rescue operations together.
If India wishes to influence US arms sales decisions,
it must develop adequate leverages to make the
United States reconsider the pros and cons very
carefully. It was reported recently that India
had “prevailed” on France to abstain from selling
Mirage aircraft to Pakistan in return for a deal
to upgrade Mirage 2000 aircraft in service with
the IAF. The supply of a new batch of F-16 aircraft
to Pakistan will certainly enhance the strike
capabilities of the PAF even though the Indian
Air Force will still continue to enjoy both qualitative
and quantitative superiority.
India is justified in seeing the move to go ahead
with the sale of the F-16s as a US attempt to
balance its strategic partnership with India by
once again propping up Pakistan as a regional
challenger, but this is a policy that many analysts
in Washington DC admit is not practical in the
21st century South Asia scenario.
India must do what is necessary to maintain its
conventional superiority, and ensure that the
new F-16s achieve nothing more than to provide
more targets to the IAF in case Pakistan again
attacks India.
(The author is Director,
Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi).
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