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The police and paramilitary forces of the state
governments and the Centre fighting Maoist terrorism
need to inculcate the army’s professional
ethos, operational culture of young officers leading
from the front and imbibe the army’s high
standards of personnel and sub-unit training.
However, they do not need the army’s physical
presence to boost their morale and achieve operational
effectiveness. Nor can the already over-stretched
army, deployed in large numbers in Jammu and Kashmir
and the north-eastern states, sustain another
major long-term internal security commitment.
The army has been deployed for counter-insurgency
operations in several north-eastern states for
over half a century. It has been engaged in counter-proxy
war operations against the so-called mujahideen
mercenaries sponsored by the Pakistan army and
the ISI in Jammu and Kashmir for two decades.
While answering a question in Parliament a few
years ago, the Defence Minister had averred that
1,20,000 army personnel are deployed for counter-insurgency
operations. This figure does not include supporting
troops. In addition, 65 battalions of the army’s
counter-insurgency force, the Rashtriya Rifles,
are deployed in J&K, and 31 of the 46 battalions
of the Assam Rifles are performing similar tasks
in the north-east.
The army’s prolonged employment on internal
security duties, its secondary role, hampers its
preparedness for its primary role of safeguarding
the territorial integrity of India’s land
borders by defeating aggression and fighting and
winning conventional wars against the country’s
military adversaries when necessary. It wears
out front line weapons and equipment. It also
imposes a heavy burden on the army’s annual
budget due to the cost of fuel, oil and lubricants,
the replenishment of ammunition expended in counter-insurgency
operations and frequent replacement of vehicles
and other equipment. Consequently, large-scale
employment for counter-insurgency operations adversely
affects the army’s modernisation programme.
The prolonged employment of the army for internal
security duties could encourage inimical neighbours
to undertake military misadventures.
Indeed, the Pakistan army launched large-scale
intrusions across the LoC into Kargil in 1999
under the mistaken belief that nine years of counter-insurgency
operations in Kashmir would have tired out the
Indian army. It is to the credit of our officers
and men that they have withstood many a challenge.
Nonetheless, such deployment reduces the peace-time
“rest and recoup” tenures of army units,
especially infantry battalions, curtails the time
that troops can spend with their families and
eventually — imperceptibly, but surely —
undermines the morale of individual soldiers and
even whole units. No thinking Indian would like
to see the latter development take place as its
consequences for national security and India’s
integrity as a nation-state would be truly horrendous.
In 2000, the Group of Ministers (GoM), led by
Mr L. K. Advani, then Deputy Prime Minister and
Home Minister, had accepted the recommendation
of the Task Force on Internal Security to designate
the CRPF as the primary Central government’s
strike force for counter-insurgency operations.
Since then, 10 years have passed and many of its
battalions have been deployed in J&K but,
regrettably, the CRPF has not so far done enough
to rise to the challenge. This was borne out by
the dastardly massacre of 74 of its men at Dantewada
and, subsequently, at Narayanpur. The report of
the E.N. Rammohan Enquiry Committee that looked
into the Dantewada incident has reportedly pointed
out major organisational and training lapses in
that operation.
For success, CRPF units must upgrade the quality
of their counter-insurgency tactics, techniques
and procedures and be armed with modern weapons
for close-quarter battle and surveillance, reconnaissance
and communications equipment suitable for jungle
terrain. Leadership at the level of commanding
officer (CO) should be drawn through lateral induction
of volunteers from the army, as was done when
the BSF was initially raised. Young IPS officers
must spend the first three years of their service
with CRPF battalions on active duty in Maoist-infested
areas.
This will instil confidence in them to lead from
the front and give them valuable operational experience
in internal security duties.
CRPF units must operate as cohesive battalions
under the direct command of the commanding officer
(CO) and not as independent companies deployed
in penny packets, with the CO responsible only
for administration. No CO of a CRPF battalion,
whose companies are deployed for anti-Maoist operations
in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh
and who himself is sitting at his battalion HQ
in Allahabad, can be effective in exercising operational
control, ensuring high standards of training and
boosting the morale of the men under his command.
Nor can he be held responsible for operational
and administrative lapses under such circumstances.
The army must continue to train CRPF and state
police personnel for counter-insurgency operations.
In fact, it should offer to re-double its training
commitments. However, the Director General CRPF
must ensure that cohesive sub-units are sent for
training together and not individual personnel.
The CRPF officers must accompany their troops
for training, and all of them should be physically
fit. Recent experience has shown that many of
the CRPF personnel report sick on arrival, the
officers rarely accompany them and the men are
disinclined to put themselves through the rigorous
training regimen.
The army and the IAF should only provide whatever
logistics support is possible.
Speculative reports have appeared about the imminent
deployment of eight or more Rashtriya Rifles battalions
in the Maoist affected areas. These battalions
and two or three Sector HQ will have to be pulled
out from the counter-insurgency grid in J&K,
provided the CCS is convinced of the operational
necessity of an immediate surge in anti-Maoist
operations. However, it is not sustainable in
the long-term. Enough evidence is available to
affirm that whenever the counter-insurgency grid
in a district is denuded of troops, the insurgents
make a rapid comeback. If such deployment is being
contemplated by the CCS on a long-term basis,
it would be better to raise additional Rashtriya
Rifles battalions for the purpose.
The regular army should not be employed for internal
security and counter-insurgency duties unless
it becomes absolutely unavoidable due to the presence
of well-trained and well-armed foreign terrorists,
and when secessionist tendencies are discerned
in a movement. Even then it should only be for
short-duration surgical operations under the umbrella
of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act with a
Unified Command in place. In certain circumstances
Special Forces units should be preferred over
infantry battalions.
The writer is Director,
Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.
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