The Return of the Nuclear Deterrence Challenge in Europe

By Robbin Laird

April, 14. The war in Ukraine has brought the nuclear question back again as a central topic in European security. And now the Trump Administration with its focus on European defense by Europeans, coupled with the unfinished business of the Ukraine war, have intensified considerations of what is the way ahead for NATO deterrence of Russia.

I worked on the Euromissile crisis and associated Alliance issues in the 1980s, including extensive work on the European nuclear forces of Britain and France. And I wrote several articles and books on these subjects.

My friend Paul Bracken has worked on these and many other nuclear issues and has argued that the nuclear challenge has returned in a second nuclear age, one which is characterized by multi-polarity, and not defined by a bi-polar competition.

I recently talked at some length with Prof. Bracken about these issues and will outline what we consider to be some key dimensions of the current situation and possible ways ahead.

The first issue is simply that the concept of deterrence has become blurred beyond recognition and there is a need to clarify what is inherent in deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons per se. Deterrence, in short, has become an intellectual garbage can for the solution of nearly all security problems.

As Bracken put it: “The vocabulary of deterrence has deteriorated far below what it used to be. The term deterrence as used now applies to so many things, from deterring China from attack Taiwan or deterring Russia in Eastern Europe or from nuclear destruction of US cities. These possibilities are bundled together as if they are one problem — all handled by deterrence. It’s impossible to have an intelligent conversation with this framework.”

He underscored that Raymond Aron, the noted French strategist, and a friend of Bracken’s boss Herman Kahn, underscored the importance of precision when discussing deterrence.

Aron’s view can be summarized as follows. “Stop talking about deterrence, unless you tell me who deters whom from what acts, with what actions, for how long, and with what weapons. Without specificity we are debating in a vacuum.”

Regarding Ukraine, Bracken has argued that the Russians have already used their nuclear weapons in terms of blocking Western actions in support of Ukraine. The threat of use clearly shapes what the West has been and is willing to do. It is simply wrong to assume otherwise. It influences what weapons the West gives to Ukraine, and when. And it defines the incrementalism of these moves.

President Trump has raised the specter of escalation in the Ukraine war in which World War III and nuclear use are readily envisaged. This “possible world” has become much more plausible in the minds of political leaders, both East and West. In so doing Trump has raised the central question of nuclear weapons. The nuclear question is now out of the closet.

The Administration has also called on Europe to up its game in terms of its own defense. But what is meant by these calls is the conventional defense of Europe

But conventional defense alone will not deter the threat of Russian nuclear weapons. There is a long history of working the challenge of determining how US nuclear weapons would be used in the direct defense of Europe. Now that question has returned with a new intensity.

President de Gaulle built a French nuclear deterrent because he did not believe the US would use its own nuclear weapons to protect France and Europe. Washington would be deterred by fear of Soviet counterattack on the United States.

The Kennedy Administration confronted these challenges and came up with a scheme called the MLF, or the Multilateral Force. The idea was that a fleet of ballistic missile subs and warships would be built, and these ships would be crewed by NATO crews and thus they would be a shared force which could be used to defend Europe.

The MLF was opposed by the British, with the UK pursing the path of an independent deterrent force built with American assistance.

But that NATO Europe no longer exists. NATO is far more diverse, and the taut blocs of the cold war are gone. The Alliance has expanded since those days with American insistence. We now have an expanded NATO, and the question of who has access to nuclear weapons in Europe, and how, is now a key question.

It is not simply a Trump Administration pressure on European defense for Europeans which is on offer: the question is now one of how Europe can live in Bracken’s second nuclear age.

Recent proposals include the French President proposing nuclear sharing in Europe, notably with Germany. Many questions are raised by this, not the least of which is how one of the must nuclear-allergic publics in Europe would accept it.

Another question that has returned is over first use of nuclear weapons. Would a European neo-MLF sign on to a no first use pledge (NFU)? If Europe declares a NFU it tilts defense spending to conventional spending. If it does not embrace a NFU, that it just might use nuclear weapons at the outset, this will have far reaching implications for the second nuclear age. It could impact decisions on the NFU pledges in China and India – and the United States, which has never embraced NFU.

These have not been thought through. In part because there are no restrictions put on what is deterred, by whom, what weapons, and at what cost and risk. We are back to Raymond Aron.

Bracken underscored that there a number of tough strategic choices which have to be made. It is not simply about messaging, NATO summits, or cheap talk.

We are now facing a significant branch point: Does Europe become a major independent actor of the second nuclear age? How are UK-French nuclear forces aligned to institutionalize European defense? Will the United States truly stand up to defend Europe if they decline to address these questions, clinging to a 1960s or 1980s model of muddling through?

These are the long-term consequences of war termination in Ukraine. They will shape not only European security but also global order.

Featured image: Combat fighter jets deploying high-speed nuclear warheads for precision target tracking. Generative AI.

– (By arrangement with SLDinfo)