UN addresses AI and the Dangers of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
By R Anil Kumar
New York/Bengaluru, Oct 2. As artificial intelligence (AI) technology continues to advance, opportunities for its large-scale application have expanded significantly. However, alongside positive advancements come serious concerns, particularly regarding its use in modern warfare and the development of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Commonly called “killer robots,” these systems leverage AI to identify, select, and eliminate human targets without requiring direct human intervention, raising profound ethical, legal, and security questions.
In his report on current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres highlighted the risks associated with the inability of AI to uphold the principle of distinction, which mandates the protection of civilians by distinguishing them from combatants, in compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL).
Since AI picks up inadvertent biases from the underlying data sets that are used to train it, “in the context of autonomous weapons, the criteria that will inform who is and who is not a combatant or target will likely involve factors including gender, age, race, and ability”, according to the preliminary report of a UN expert group.
The potential of artificial intelligence to revolutionise robotic drone swarms presents another particularly dangerous development. Current armed conflicts have shown the increasing utilisation of drones on the battlefield to not just carry out surveillance and intelligence tasks, but also undertake offensive missions. With the help of AI, these low-cost robots could form highly autonomous swarms capable of striking multiple targets simultaneously on a large scale, possibly challenging the principles of proportionality and precaution under IHL.
A primary concern is the challenge of maintaining meaningful human control over these systems, as direct control over swarms is both impossible and counterproductive since the individual units need to rely on autonomous decision-making to form a swarm effectively.
Since machines cannot be held responsible for breaches of international law, any decision by LAWS must ultimately be traceable to a human.
In his Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General laid out recommendations on the governance of AI and autonomous weapons systems, including calling for a legally binding treaty to prohibit LAWS that function without human control or oversight, to be concluded by 2026. At Summit of the Future, Member States reiterated the need for further cooperation and agreed to continue talks “with the aim to develop an instrument, without prejudging its nature, and other possible measures to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems.”
This process is to be facilitated by the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (GGE LAWS).
With AI’s capabilities progressing rapidly and unpredictably, these efforts present a path towards global governance of this emerging technology, making use of AI’s tremendous potential for good in accelerating progress on the Sustainable Development Goals; while keeping in check the risks associated with its usage in weapons systems.
The New Forever War
Lessons from Ukraine and Iran: Adaptation Remains Key
The juxtaposition of the Russia-Ukraine war and unfolding US-Israel-Iran war offers a compelling window to the evolving character of contemporary warfare. One is a protracted, grinding contest of endurance; the other, a sharp demonstration of rapid, multi-domain coercion. Yet, taken together, they underline a common truth: technological change has not simplified war, it has made it more complex, more diffuse and less predictable.
If anything, the promise of decisive victory has receded, replaced by a spectrum of outcomes shaped by persistence, adaptability and the management of escalation.
Ukraine has come to embody the logic of attrition in the 21st century. The battlefield is saturated with low-cost, high-impact systems, where the denial of air superiority, rather than its attainment, has defined the operational tempo. Russia’s initial assumptions of a swift victory underestimated both Ukrainian resilience and Western cohesion. What followed has been a slow recalibration, with Moscow shifting to a long-war footing, leveraging external partnerships and informational strategies, even as it absorbs sustained economic and military pressure. The steady flow of Western military assistance has not decisively tilted the balance, but it has ensured that Ukraine remains in the fight, transforming the conflict into a test of endurance rather than manoeuvre.
The battlefield is saturated with low-cost, high-impact systems, where the denial of air superiority, rather than its attainment, has defined the operational tempo.
This war also reveals how transparency has altered strategy. Commercial satellites, open-source intelligence and networked communication have made it exceedingly difficult to achieve surprise.
Russian force concentrations were visible well before the invasion, complicating operational secrecy. At the same time, the proliferation of drones and loitering munitions has redefined the tactical battlefield, turning it into a constantly surveilled and contested space.
In such an environment, mass alone is insufficient; it must be paired with adaptability and technological integration. Russia’s gradual shift towards attritional warfare, relying on artillery, glide bombs and sheer volume, reflects both necessity and constraint.
In contrast, the US-Iran confrontation reflects a different pathway of speed, precision and multi-domain integration. Building on precedents such as the 2025 Israel-Iran 12-day war, the US-Israeli campaign demonstrated how air dominance can be established swiftly through a combination of kinetic strikes and ‘invisible’ enablers: satellite data, cyber operations and electronic warfare. Early targeting of leadership nodes and critical infrastructure enabled the US and Israel to degrade Iran’s retaliatory capacity in a matter of days, showcasing the potential of integrated operations across domains.
Yet, this apparent success was far from complete. Iran’s capacity to retaliate asymmetrically through ballistic missiles, drone swarms and proxy networks highlights the enduring relevance of indirect strategies.
Its targeting of critical maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz underscores the economic dimension of modern conflict. Energy markets reacted sharply as regional instability threatens to spiral out of control and draw in additional actors. What seemed like a controlled, high-precision campaign has revealed the risks of escalation in a well-linked global economy, something that forced Trump’s hand when he was forced to postpone strikes against Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure for a period of five days.
Energy markets reacted sharply as regional instability threatens to spiral out of control and draw in additional actors.
What binds these two cases is the persistence of friction in modern conflict. Both Russia and the US entered their respective campaigns with expectations of decisive outcomes based on conventional superiority.
Both encountered adversaries adept at exploiting asymmetry, leveraging new technologies and stretching the conflict across domains— military, informational and economic. The result is not victory in the classical sense, but a messy equilibrium shaped by adaptation and endurance. War has become less about decisive battles and more about managing protracted competition under conditions of uncertainty.
At the strategic level, the message is clear: wars between capable adversaries are unlikely to be short or clean. Alliances, economic resilience and escalation management have become as critical as battlefield success.
Ukraine’s ability to sustain resistance is inseparable from Western support, just as US effectiveness against Iran has depended on coordination with regional partners. Conversely, isolation constrains options and magnifies vulnerabilities.
The role of information, whether through cyber operations, narrative shaping or global media, has moved from the periphery to the centre of strategic competition, influencing both domestic legitimacy and international support.
Operationally, the character of warfare is being reshaped by a contest for the electromagnetic spectrum and the integration of non-kinetic tools. Ukraine demonstrates how denying air superiority can blunt a stronger adversary, while Iran illustrates how quickly it can be achieved when cyber and space capabilities are effectively employed. In both cases, logistics, now under constant threat from precision strikes, must be re-imagined for resilience rather than efficiency. A shift from ‘just-in-time’ supply chains to dispersed systems with inbuilt redundancy reflects a broader recognition that survivability is as important as capacity.
Ukraine demonstrates how denying air superiority can blunt a stronger adversary, while Iran illustrates how quickly it can be achieved when cyber and space capabilities are effectively employed.
Tactically, the democratization of lethality stands out as perhaps the most transformative trend. Cheap drones and autonomous systems have altered the cost calculus of war, enabling smaller actors to impose disproportionate costs on more advanced militaries.
The battlefield has become increasingly transparent and contested, where survival depends on mobility, dispersion and rapid adaptation. Traditional platforms, tanks, aircraft and fixed installations, must now operate under the constant threat of detection and destruction. Success at this level requires not only technological sophistication but organizational flexibility, empowering lower-level commanders to make decisions in real time.
What emerges, then, is not a neat template for future wars, but a cautionary tale. Military power remains indispensable, but it is no longer decisive in isolation. The interplay of technology, economics and political means that conflicts are harder to end or win.
For policymakers, the challenge lies in aligning objectives with capabilities, avoiding the temptation of quick victories and preparing for the long haul. These conflicts reinforce a key proposition: in contemporary warfare, it is not size or even initial superiority that determines outcomes, but the ability to learn, adjust and endure in a rapidly shifting battlespace. Adaptation, rather than dominance alone, has become the currency of success.
