DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Finding a solution to Siachen

by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (Retd) Published:May 2012

More than a week after the terrible avalanche at Gayari (in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) buried nearly 110 Pakistan Army soldiers and another 70-odd civilians, there is no sign of recovery in spite of Pakistan using every possible effort and even heavy machinery to shift the thousands of tonnes of snow that has settled above the unfortunate victims of nature’s anger. Any and every human being who can visualise the tragedy cannot remain unaffected.

General Kayani’s anguish and palpable helplessness while on a visit to that area was writ large on his face and his words, and in our own helplessness we can only empathise with him and the Pakistan Army. The tragedy, so soon after the major earthquake further south, has once again brought the issue of the “Siachen conflict” to the fore, and the tragedy may still serve the two countries if a solution to it can be found on the basis of fair and established norms.

But the question now has to be raised: Can we look for a solution to this conflict and cooperatively try to maintain a peaceful environment in that region in the hope that natural disasters at least would become less frequent, if not totally eliminated? The obvious answer is yes, especially since the two countries had signed an agreement as far back as July 27, 1949, as to how the cease-fire line is to be drawn in this area; and this agreement has to be only implemented in word and spirit. That agreement, normally called the Karachi Agreement signed by senior military officers from both sides (as a follow-on to the cease-fire agreement), clearly demarcated the Cease-Fire Line (CFL) based on the factual position on the ground as on that day. However, the CFL was demarcated on a one-inch map but only up to what came to be known as Point NJ-9842. The bilateral agreement specifies that the final stages of the CFL would be demarcated up to Khor and “thence north to the glaciers.”

Here we must note the use of plural in mentioning the CFL from this point onward. The CFL was left undemarcated at this point, no doubt, because it was not expected at that time that the high mountains to the north could become a source of conflict. But both governments had agreed that the line would continue to Khor, “thence north to the glaciers.” Incidentally, the CFL (and its successor LoC) runs south to north for nearly 15-km before it stops at NJ-9842. The use of plural in mentioning glaciers clearly indicates that there is more than one glacier in consideration here. A well- established principle and custom of demarcating borders and lines of control in mountainous areas is to follow the high crest separating the two watersheds on either side. This is also why mountain passes usually mark the boundaries.

North of NJ-9842 there are two glaciers: the Siachen Glacier to the east of the high crest and the Baltoro Glacier (where the avalanche took place) to the west of the crest which goes by the name of the Saltoro Ridge. Indian Army posts defending the Siachen Glacier are located on the Saltoro Ridge which forms a natural watershed between the two glaciers; and hence natural and consistent with customary as well as formally defined borders. Logically, therefore, the Saltoro Ridge (which runs south to north before it alters towards the north-west closer to the K-2 mountain) should be defined and demarcated as the mutually acceptable line in terms of the Karachi Agreement.

Unfortunately, Pakistan has not been willing to accept what are well-established principles as well as the substance of the Karachi Agreement it had signed. The nomenclature of the AGPL (Actual Ground Position Line), adopted to give some space to Pakistan, which has told its people that its army is fighting in Siachen (though it is not even at its edge), does not provide any sanctity to the line. In terms of the terminology, the AGPL merely indicates the ground position of the two sides at a particular time with little or no obligation to maintain it at the CFL or LoC. The term was adopted on the request of Pakistan; but perhaps Pakistan did not realise that this would leave the region wide open to any future military deployment by either side since the LoC would not connect to a recognised and accepted border.

The term Siachen is used rather loosely even by people who know better; and so is the term “de-militarisation” which Pakistan has been seeking to adopt since 1948. De-militarisation is not an option unless we are willing to accept the same for the state of J&K! A few days earlier General Pervez Musharraf had claimed that Pakistan’s aggression in Kargil was “tit for tat” for Siachen! He concedes that Pakistan had laid claim to some part of the Siachen Glacier which in his view was “no-man’s land.” This is indeed strange for a former DGMO, Army Chief and President of a country. Perhaps, the brave soldier had never read the Karachi Agreement? But responsible countries and professional armies don’t start a war of aggression merely because the chief “felt very bad.”

If we are to solve the problem in that area, the core issue is to make the map of Saltoro ridge and the location of Indian (and Pakistani) posts public. It is curious that such maps continue to be marked “Secret” even though the only people who know the exact position are the Indian and Pakistan armies along the Saltoro ridge! So, who are we keeping this secret from? Once the maps are made available to the public on both sides and its consistence with the Karachi Agreement re-emphasised, there would, no doubt, be greater acceptance of the reality and the utility of extending the LoC along the Saltoro ridge northward to K-2. Ultimately, this is the only solution to the battle against the elements.

The writer is Director-General, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

Courtesy: The Tribune

Related Articles

Back to top button