India’s shrinking fighter fleet: A costly national security concern
By Gp Capt (Retd) Vishwajeet Kumar
The Indian Air Force (IAF) is seen extensively carrying out HADR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief) missions within and outside the country which not only gets praised for its highly professional work but also reinforces the importance of its operational capabilities. IAF’s arm of advanced transport aircraft like C-17, C-130 and helicopter fleet of Chinooks and Mi-17 V5, have been discharging their strategic and tactical HADR role respectively in a commendable manner. Recently, IAF provided HADR support in Myanmar and Thailand post the deadly earthquake in March 2025.
However, the primary role of IAF being the security of India’s airspace has to be mainly ensured though an effective fleet of advanced fighter aircraft. With its depleting fighter squadrons, unstable neighbourhood, unpredictable world order and induction of fifth-generation Chinese J-20 and J-35 stealth fighter aircraft on its northern borders, the alarm bells have started ringing towards India’s national and regional aerospace security.
To handle a two-front war, the IAF is sanctioned a strength of 42 squadrons of fighter aircraft fleet, however due to phasing out of aging fleet of Mig-21, Mig-23 and Mig-27, delayed procurement and delayed indigenisation, the fleet strength has depleted to just around 30 squadrons. The depletion in the fighter squadron strength is quite alarming for two reasons. Firstly, acquisitions take a long time due to availability, cost concerns, indecision both at service headquarter and Ministry of Defence (MoD). Secondly, there has been a fast upgradation of advanced fighters in our northern and western neighbourhood.
Lost decades for IAF
The ageing Mig-21 fleet being the largest component of IAF’s fighter fleet and vintage Jaguar/Mig-29 fleet was planned to be replaced with a mix of LCA, MMRCA and MRFA programme of local production as well as foreign acquisitions. MMRCA (Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft) programme of acquiring 126 aircraft dragged on for years and finally it was cancelled in 2014 post acquisition of 36 Rafale aircraft (two squadrons) from France. The emergency acquisition of two squadrons should have been followed up with faster decision-making in acquiring more Rafale squadrons through direct purchase or local production but it never happened. Orders with HAL for supply of LCA MK1 & MK2 has been extremely slow and way behind schedule thereby complicating the matters further.
HAL’s LCA programme
This project was conceived and started in 1983 to meet the future requirements of IAF and Indian Navy’s fighter aircraft. It is a project designed by DRDO’s ADA (Aeronautical Development Agency) and manufactured by HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited). The LCA made its first flight in 2001 and entered into service in 2015. In due course, IAF ordered 40 LCA MK1 and 83 MK1A but both supplies have been extremely behind schedule. HAL has delivered two Squadrons of LCA MK1 but MK1A has been extremely delayed primarily due to USA’s GE company not supplying the contracted number of engines in the last more than two years. GE has just begun supplying engines with its first delivery recently which gives some hope of start of LCA MK 1A aircraft to IAF in near future. However, dependency on a foreign collaborator for the engines would continue to be a big limiting factor till India attains self-sufficiency in this sector too.
Fighters on offer for the IAF
India’s fighter procurement strategy could be a mix of indigenous capabilities and foreign collaborations. IAF is quite familiar with the major fighter aircraft producing companies of the world since its previous evaluation experience for the MMRCA project. Rafale, Grippen, and Eurofighter apart from Russian MIG and Sukhoi have been dealt by IAF in the past. As per news reports, the front runners appear to be French Rafale, American F-35 and Russian SU-57. The last two even participated in the just concluded Aero India show at Bengaluru. A look at the techno-economic-strategic aspect of the three may help us in the better understanding of its selection for the IAF.
Rafale F4, a 4.5th gen fighter, with its earlier variant of two squadrons already in service in IAF becomes an automatic choice as part of India’s quest for its MRFA. It is known for its agility and manoeuvrability with large payloads. It is considered more cost effective with lower operating and maintenance cost in comparison to F-35. Rafale offers full sovereign control over its operational parameters in comparison to F-35. However, how far is the French government willing to transfer its technology for make-in-India initiative, needs more clarity. Also, with Chineese fifth-gen fighters already in India’s neighbourhood, is the IAF and the govt of India willing to go in for a 4.5th gen Rafale variant or stick to the existing Rafale which will be in service for the next three to four decades?
The F-35, a fifth-gen multi-role, offensive strike fighter, is a single-seat, single-engine (Prat & Whitney F135-PW-100 afterburning turbofan), stealth fighter aircraft with three variants. It can achieve max speed of Mach 1.6 with a range of approximately 2,200 km. It is equipped with advanced sensors including an AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) radar and AI-driven combat systems. It has seamless data sharing capabilities. F-35A is a conventional take-off and landing aircraft for the air force, F-35B, a short field take-off and vertical landing aircraft for the marine force and F-35C is for the navy.
As of date, the US manufacturer Lockheed Martin has already delivered more than 1,000 F-35s worldwide including USAF. F-35 has the advantage of large global supply chain and extensive NATO interoperability. F-35s have proven their operational capabilities in the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. However, what may be of concern to India may be its exorbitant cost (approximately $80-110 million), tech transfer for its local production and American reliability in times of crisis due to complex software integration and strict U.S export control regulations.
The SU-57 is a reported fifth-gen twin engine (Saturn AL41F1 afterburning turbofan), Russian defensive, air superiority partial stealth fighter because of reduced radar signature. It can attain a max speed of Mach 2 with approximately maximum range of 3,000 km. It’s highly manoeuvrable due to its twin engines and thrust-vectoring engines. It is also equipped with multi-band radar suite including L-band for stealth detection. The SU-57 is expected to be cost effective ($35-40 million) in comparison to the F-35s. The most favourable aspect for India could be Russian reliability in crisis, operational familiarity and economical cost with no operational limitations.
The different scenarios to make good the shortages could be a mix of indigenous developments and international partnerships. The roadmap could be as follows:
Scenario A
One hundred fourteen Rafale aircraft from France as part of the proposed MRFA (Multi Role Fighter Aircraft) programme along with indigenous development of AMCA (Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft). The Rafale, a 4.5th-gen fighter already with IAF, offers proven multi role capabilities with nuclear deterrence. This could be the most preferred path due to IAF’s familiarities in terms of tech, logistics and training. The purchase of these many Rafales would amount to about five squadrons which would take care of the immediate shortfall in squadron strength.
The purchase cost of these many Rafales could be an issue but with such large orders, India would be in a commanding position to leverage its strategic partnership with France at the same time make a huge business sense to the French govt. Additionally, India can continue with its indigenous stealth, fifth-gen AMCA development programme. India’s DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) responsible for the development of AMCA, must fast-track this development by a judicious mix of Indian public/private companies as well as foreign friendly collaborations. This approach would be a time-tested one considering French reliability and at the same time avoiding American unreliability at times of crisis and foster development of indigenous advanced fighter capabilities.
Scenario B
Keeping in sync with the enhanced India-US strategic partnership, India could go in for its immediate MRFA need with US F-15 EX, a 4.5th-gen heavy fighter with advanced avionics, large payload and long-range strike potential. At the same time, continue with accelerated AMCA development for the fifth-gen fighter programme. This scenario balances India’s immediate fighter shortages along with its interoperability with QUAD partners like the US, Japan and Australia.
Scenario C
This could be a Russian option which is time-tested but of late witnessed inconsistent delivery schedule and cost over-runs. India could meet its MRFA requirement through Russian Su-35 or MiG- 35 along with few squadrons of SU-57, a reported fifth-gen fighter. This option may ensure affordability, familiarity and timely delivery but with concerns of US sanctions.
A combination of the above measures is likely to ensure the following:
(a) Immediate induction of at least two squadrons of existing Rafale fighters.
(b) Commencement of MRFA class fighters by 2027-28 to ensure raising of five to six squadrons by 2032.
(c) Freeze LCA Mk2 design in 2025 so as start production by 2028-29 to have six squadrons by 2035 as replacement for Jaguars/Mig 29.
(d) Priorities AMCA development to have first flight in 2028-29 and serial production by 2032-33.
(e) Secure foreign collaborations for engines and stealth tech at the earliest.
(f) Aim to start production of AMCA by 2035 so as to have approximately five squadrons by 2040.
(g) In the interim, upgrade the entire fleet of Su-30 MkI with AESA radar, EW suites and Astra MK2 missiles.
(h) Strengthen force multipliers like, combat drones, AEWs, AWACs and refuellers.
Recommendations
In order to arrest and augment the falling fighter strength of IAF by putting in place few institutional mechanisms in place, the following measures need to be taken at the earliest:
(a) Decision-making at the PMO level to avoid further bureaucratic delays in facilitating early delivery of MRFA and AMCA class of fighters to IAF. The PMO also needs to look at the inability of GTRE in producing required engines for our fighter development programme and fix it without any further delay. Restore the HAL leadership to a senior IAF aviator to bring synergy and urgency among different arms of HAL as is the case with naval officers heading shipyards.
(b) Speed and efficiency in production/procurement – scale up HAL production of LCA MK1 and MK2 and go in for G2G for MRFA and FGFA programme.
(c) Private sector investment – encourage HAL, Tata, L&T, Adani, Godrej and Kirloskar to tie-up with India’s strategic partner firms like Dassault, GE and BAE to expedite MRFA and FGFA programmes. Private sector involvement in developing cutting edge aerospace tech like stealth and engines is the crying need of the hour.
(d) Minimise fighter diversity – this would help in the easy supply, maintenance and training requirements thereby facilitating better serviceability status of the fighter fleet.
(e) Freezing of design specifications – IAF to freeze LCA MK2 ad AMCA design specifications at the earliest so as facilitate its early prototype delivery.
(f) Adequate budgetary support – MoD must ensure timely enhanced capital layout for the MRFA and AMCA acquisition programme.
Conclusion
As discussed above, various options appear to be available on the table. However, what is of prime importance is an immediate intervention at the PMO level in selecting 114 MRFA, either French, Russian, American or European to arrest and augment the grave slide in the total number of effective fighter squadrons. Secondly, there should be accelerated delivery of LCA (Tejas) MK1 and MK2 to IAF by overcoming roadblocks like engine and production scaling up. Thirdly, accelerated development of AMCA with suitable engine and stealth tech needs to be tied up immediately with domestic as well as foreign collaborators to meet IAF’s fifth-gen fighter requirement latest by 2035. This has also attained urgency in view of the Chinese J-20 and J-35 challenge in the immediate neighbourhood as well as to establish India as an indigenous aerospace power in the near future.
One school of thought may suggest going in for foreign fighters, both for MRFA and fifth-gen in place of AMCA, considering past poor track record of indigenous fighter development programme. However, that won’t be in the long-term interest of the country because nation’s security can only be ensured with indigenous capabilities. In no case, should IAF and the MoD repeat its mistake of the 1960s when it abandoned its indigenous HF Marut fighter development programme and went in for foreign aircraft thereby missing the indigenous development of fighters completely. IAF leadership need to be absolutely clear in putting up their case to MoD regarding MRFA and FGFA (AMCA) and pursue them relentlessly irrespective of the change in guard with passage of time. Lastly, our top politico-bureaucratic leadership needs to keep in mind that no price can be too high for the insurance of our national security. Jai Hind!
