- But, Are We on the Right Track?!
With the recent appointment of General Anil Chauhan as the CDS (Chief of Defence Staff), albeit more than eight months after the death of his predecessor General Bipin Rawat in a helicopter accident in the Nilgiris, the issue of theatre commands has been put once again on the front burner.
It may be recalled that when the multi-hatted post of the CDS was established, the ‘First among Equals’ 4-star officer was given a plethora of responsibilities which also included a mandate to bring about jointness through optimal and cost-effective utilisation of resources. In pursuance of the aforesaid, he was also given the authority to create Theatre Commands if, and when required. However, instead of first looking at ways and means to achieve the stated objectives, for some inexplicable reasons, integrated theatre commands started to be viewed as the panacea for all problems.
Architects of the theatre commands then plunged themselves into hurried conceptualization of the plan with self-declared and rather unrealistic timelines. The resulting roadmap that has emerged is a curious mixture of geographical/functional structures that not only provide sub-optimal solutions but also appear to defy logic at times.
First has been the Air Defence Command. One wonders if it was the already existing tri-service synergy that prompted DMA to call it the low-hanging fruit to be plucked and converted into a tri-service AD command? It is however not clear as to what additional operational value would accrue with the creation of a stand-alone AD command, especially when inter-service synergy is already in place. On the other hand, there are many questions that need to be addressed. For example, would creation of AD command mean that the entire air space over the Indian Territory including territorial waters will come under its sole operational control? Wouldn’t this be in direct conflict with other operational commands – present and envisaged – which are/would be responsible for specific sector/theatres in different parts of the country? Won’t such a move possibly pose a risk of fratricide, as was witnessed by the Egyptian AD Command during the ‘Yom Kipur’ War in 1973. But more than anything else, in the present-day scenario of the same sensors/control systems – whether ground based or airborne – and the multi-role shooter platforms, the very idea of a separate AD Command becomes an unviable proposition. The same has been pointed out ad nauseum through various writings and it is hoped the same would get due consideration.
The second has been the proposed creation of an all-encompassing Maritime Theatre Command with command and control over of the entire Indian naval fleet and coastal defence operations vested in it. It appears that the Navy has been integrated unto itself along with the Coast Guard in a single maritime theatre that would not only include both the India’s seaboards in the West and East but also the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean in the South and, all other maritime domains which may be of interest to it in its Blue-Water avatar. While, this may indeed be a viable proposition, one wonders as to what would happen to the entire ops staff at Naval HQ under the DCNS, which has been coordinating naval operations at the national level all this while. It is also given to understand that the two operational commands viz. Western and Eastern would continue to perform as before under the overall command of Maritime Theatre Command (MTC). Should that be the case, one can’t see much improvement from the existing arrangement, not to speak of the huge financial burden that would have to be borne in creating the gargantuan MTC HQ.
Having perceivably taken care of the maritime and AD domains, now is the turn for land-based geographical commands, wherein the Army-led team has envisaged creating two theatres; one catering for Pakistan in the west and the other in the north for China and in the process merging all its existing operational commands. However, not knowing how to integrate its Northern Command which abuts both the LOC with Pakistan and the LAC with China, it is being kept as a separate entity to look after the dual threats in J&K sector. Ironically, citing vastness and unwieldiness of its borders with both the adversaries, Army had expanded from the then four army commands to six operational commands, especially after the 1962 war with China; creating Central Command for China and an additional South-Western Command for the Pak front. As the Navy would have little or no role to play in the land wars, the geographical theatre commands envisage parceling out the meagre leftover IAF assets into the three integrated theatre commands, inflicting a serious blow to the IAF’s concept of indivisibility of air power as a war-winning formula.
The question that looms large is: Are we on the right track going headlong to create Theatre Commands, no matter what the costs? It is true that after the Kargil operations, a need had been felt for higher defence reforms to promote greater jointness among the services. Wasn’t that the reason why the IDS (Integrated Defence Staff) HQ was created in the first place? That it has not been able to function to its full potential has been due to the fact that it remained headless for almost two decades after it came into being. But it has all the ingredients to bring about the required jointness be it acquisitions, doctrines, training or operations. And now that the appointment of CDS has become a reality, won’t it be prudent to give it an opportunity to rise to its full potential? As the multi-hatted head of the IDS and with his ‘Primus Inter Pares’ status as the Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (PC-COSC), the CDS should be given the operational authority to ensure synergistic formulation of inter-services higher directions of war which could be translated into joint execution by the affiliated commands in the field.
Needless to say, this would also be the most cost-effective way to ensure jointness – a key mandate for the CDS.
– Air Marshal VK ‘Jimmy’ Bhatia (Retd)
