Operation Sindoor: India’s Military Masterstroke

By R Anil Kumar 

• India’s Operation Sindoor Exposes Vulnerabilities in US Defence Dominance; A Wake-Up Call for US Defence Reform

• India’s Operation Sindoor has shown, wars of the future will be decided by those who can “think faster, build faster, and fight smarter”

Operation Sindoor is more than a military victory for India — it is a clarion call for the US to reform its defence establishment. Without urgent action to break monopolies, speed up innovation, and build adaptable, scalable systems, the US risks losing its military edge. The clock is ticking, and the lessons from India are too clear to ignore.

Bengaluru. India’s Operation Sindoor, executed in May 2025, has sent shock waves through the global defence community, exposing critical vulnerabilities in the US defence establishment and highlighting the urgent need for reform.

The Operation Sindoor’s success, driven by rapid innovation, cost-effective systems, and decisive execution, stands in sharp contrast to the slow, monopolistic, and expensive defence practices that dominate the United States.

The United States is in urgent need of fundamental defence reform. Not just adjustments. Not just marginal gains. A full-scale overhaul. The wars of today—and the even more brutal ones looming on the horizon—will not be won by the slow, the bloated, or the bureaucratically constrained.

They will be won by those who can think faster, build faster, and fight smarter—and above all, by those who master the physics of lethality required on the modern battlefield.

The goal of modern war is no longer to prepare for indefinite, grinding campaigns. The objective is clear: wars must be won quickly and decisively with superior military capabilities. That demands a defence ecosystem built not just for speed—but for scale.

The United States has fallen into the trap of believing that one magic platform, one exquisite system, can win future wars. It can’t. Winning will require modularity, volume, redundancy, and continuous adaptation—built into a system that is ultimately faster, leaner, and more efficient.

That means rapidly identifying battlefield requirements, acquisition, research, iterative development and manufacturing, and deployment across an industrial base designed to surge—not stall. India just proved what that looks like.

Operation Sindoor: Precision, Speed, And Impact

Operation Sindoor was launched in response to a deadly terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir, killing 26 civilians. India’s military response was swift and surgical: over a four-day campaign, Indian forces targeted terrorist camps and, when Pakistan retaliated, escalated to precision strikes on Pakistani air bases and command centres.

The operation crippled Pakistan’s radar and air defence networks, dismantled command and control, and exposed the weaknesses of Chinese and Turkish-supplied systems. Within hours, Pakistan was forced to seek a ceasefire, underscoring the effectiveness and deterrent value of India’s approach.

India’s Cost-Effective Innovation Vs US Defence Monopolies

India’s military achievements are not just about battlefield success—they are rooted in a philosophy of affordable, scalable, and rapidly deployable systems. The Pinaka rocket, for example, costs less than $56,000, compared to the US GMLRS missile at $148,000.

The Akashteer missile defence system was developed and fielded at a fraction of the cost of US-made Patriot or NASAMS platforms. This stands in stark contrast to the US, where a handful of defence giants—Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General Dynamics—dominate the landscape, stifling competition and innovation.

The US defence industry, once a symbol of strength, now resembles a cartel. The number of prime contractors has shrunk from 51 to fewer than 10, making it difficult for the Pentagon to negotiate or drive innovation. Cost-plus contracting further insulates these firms from risk, encouraging cost overruns and the development of over-engineered, expensive platforms—exemplified by the F-35 fighter jet’s $1.7 trillion lifetime cost and persistent performance issues.

Structural Challenges in the US Defence Industry

The United States defence industry faces significant structural challenges that limit its ability to compete effectively with emerging alternatives like India’s cost-effective manufacturing model.

The industry’s concentration among a small number of prime contractors has created what analysts describe as a cartelized system with limited genuine competition.

According to Department of Defence studies, the number of prime defence contractors has declined dramatically from 51 to fewer than 10, fundamentally altering the competitive landscape and reducing incentives for innovation and cost reduction.

This consolidation has occurred despite soaring defence budgets expected to approach $1 trillion by 2025, indicating that increased spending has not translated into improved competition or efficiency.

The monopolistic concentration of the US defence industry manifests in several problematic ways that directly impact military readiness and fiscal responsibility. Major contractors like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon Technologies, and General Dynamics dominate the global arms market, with nine of the world’s top 20 defence firms by revenue being American companies.

While this concentration once represented strength through specialization and scale, it has evolved into a system where contractors have little incentive to drive innovation, reduce costs, or adapt quickly to changing requirements.

The lack of genuine market competition has created an environment where cost-plus contracting shields firms from the consequences of budget overruns and delays.

A 2024 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies revealed that 61% of major defence contracts now go to companies with no commercial business, rising to 86% when firms like Boeing with limited commercial operations are included.

This isolation from broader market pressures has created a defence industry that operates according to different economic principles than the competitive commercial sector. The resulting system prioritizes technical specifications over cost-effectiveness and favours complex, expensive platforms over simpler, more affordable alternatives that might prove more suitable for contemporary warfare requirements.

Acquisition Process Inefficiencies

The US defence acquisition process has become notoriously slow and bureaucratic, often requiring years or even decades to field new equipment.

This timeline mismatch with the pace of modern warfare has been starkly exposed by conflicts like the war in Ukraine, where rapid adaptation and production scaling proved crucial to military effectiveness. While American weapons systems like Javelins and HIMARS demonstrated their technical superiority, production systems struggled to keep pace with demand, forcing the Pentagon to rely on ageing factories and slow supply chains to meet urgent requirements.

The acquisition system’s fundamental structure creates perverse incentives that prioritize compliance with bureaucratic processes over operational effectiveness and speed.

Many battlefield innovations since 9/11, including counter-IED kits and unmanned systems, were introduced through emergency procurement channels that bypassed formal acquisition processes. While these stopgap measures enabled rapid deployment of critical capabilities, they highlighted the systematic failures of the standard procurement system to respond to urgent operational needs.

The reliance on emergency measures for innovation demonstrates that the formal acquisition process has become an obstacle to rather than an enabler of military effectiveness.

Cost-plus contracting models further exacerbate these systemic problems by removing financial risk from contractors and creating incentives for program complexity and duration rather than efficiency and speed.

The F-35 fighter jet program exemplifies these challenges, with a lifetime cost estimated at $1.7 trillion and a development process characterized by delays and performance shortfalls.

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall’s acknowledgment that the F-35 represented “a serious mistake” and his warning about creating “perpetual monopolies” reflects growing recognition within the defence establishment that fundamental reform is necessary to maintain American military competitiveness.

Systemic Weaknesses and the Need for Reform

The US acquisition system is notoriously slow, with new equipment often taking years or decades to reach the field. The war in Ukraine exposed the inability of the US industrial base to surge production or adapt quickly, forcing reliance on outdated factories and slow supply lines. Many battlefield innovations since 9/11 were only fielded through emergency channels, bypassing normal procurement—highlighting systemic delays that remain unaddressed.

A further problem is the increasing isolation of US defence firms from commercial markets. Over 60% of major contracts now go to companies with no commercial business, rising to 86% when including firms like Boeing with limited commercial work. This insularity, a legacy of post-Cold War consolidation, has led to a defence sector resistant to market pressures and innovation.

Lessons From India: Agility, Affordability, And Scalability

India’s approach offers a compelling alternative. Its defence industry emphasises rapid development, integration of advanced technology, and cost-effective production.

Systems like BrahMos and Akashteerare not boutique prototypes but proven, battle-ready platforms. India’s integrated air defence network, which seamlessly links air force and ground forces, is described by experts as “unique”—even surpassing current US capabilities in some respects.

This model demonstrates that lethality, affordability, and scalability can coexist. India’s ability to deploy, test, and validate new systems in actual combat provides a blueprint for the US to follow, especially as global threats evolve and the pace of conflict accelerates.

Urgent Path Forward for the US

Experts warn that the time for incremental change is over. The US must:

• Reform its acquisition process for speed, iteration, and frontline feedback
• Break up monopolies or foster genuine competition and alternative suppliers
• Treat allies like India and Israel as co-equal production partners, not just buyers
• Establish permanent learning teams embedded in conflict zones to feed real-time lessons into system design

A recent White House executive order has acknowledged these issues, directing the Secretary of Defence to deliver a reform plan. But experts caution that true change requires a full-scale overhaul of both procurement and organisational culture.

Facing The China Challenge

China’s massive military and population advantage mean future conflicts will be won not by size, but by the ability to innovate, produce economically, and adapt at speed.

As India’s Operation Sindoor has shown, wars of the future will be decided by those who can “think faster, build faster, and fight smarter”.

Operation Sindoor is more than a military victory for India—it is a clarion call for the US to reform its defence establishment. Without urgent action to break monopolies, speed up innovation, and build adaptable, scalable systems, the US risks losing its military edge. The clock is ticking, and the lessons from India are too clear to ignore.

The goal of modern war is no longer to prepare for indefinite, grinding campaigns. The objective is clear: wars must be won quickly and decisively with superior military capabilities. That demands a defence ecosystem built not just for speed—but for scale.

America’s Acquisition Pipeline Is Too Slow for Modern War

The war in Ukraine laid bare a staggering truth: America’s research, development, and deployment cycle is operating on a timeline the battlefield no longer respects. Ukraine’s defence since 2022 has leaned heavily on western systems like Javelins anti-armor system, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and air defence Stinger missiles—but even this modest proxy war pushed U.S. defence production to the brink. The Pentagon had to scramble to restart dormant Stinger lines. Javelin production was capped at peacetime capacity. HIMARS launchers, though effective, were too few, too expensive, and too slow to replenish.

Perhaps most telling was the U.S. military’s inability to produce enough artillery shells to keep pace with battlefield consumption. In a high-intensity war, the need for hundreds of thousands of shells per month has outstripped America’s industrial capacity. Instead of ramping up quickly, the Pentagon found itself reliant on stretched supply chains, outdated manufacturing infrastructure, and timelines measured in years—not weeks.

Since 9/11, many of the most effective frontline battlefield solutions—the real “tip of the spear” technologies—haven’t come through the formal acquisition pipeline at all. They’ve come from outside it.

Programs like the Rapid Equipping Force, Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements (JUONS), and commander discretionary funds were built as temporary workarounds to bypass a system too slow and too rigid to meet battlefield urgency.

These stopgap authorities allowed private firms and battlefield commanders to field lifesaving tools—from counter-IED gear to surveillance drones—without waiting for years for approval.

But these were improvisations, not reforms. The result is a two-track system: an official pipeline too bureaucratic to fight a modern war, and an unofficial one too fragile to scale. Instead of codifying the agility created in wartime, the US let it dissolve in peacetime.

The US has been surviving on battlefield duct tape—when what we need is a complete redesign.

These are not exceptions—they are symptoms. The US acquisition model, built around Cold War cycles and peacetime audits, is too brittle to support the demands of wartime replenishment, rapid adaptation, or scalable production under fire.

Cost Structures Are Unsustainable

The US is not just too slow. It is also too expensive. American weapons are among the most advanced in the world—but that edge is being priced out of viability. A single Tomahawk missile costs up to $2 million. A single HIMARS launcher costs over $5 million.

Meanwhile, adversaries and allies alike are building systems with similar or superior battlefield impact for a fraction of the cost.

Drones are the new artillery shells of the modern battlefield. Armies don’t need dozens—they need thousands. Cheap, expendable, and ubiquitous, drones must come in variety and volume to swarm, surveil, strike, and survive.

But the US defence industry has not embraced this truth. Instead, it continues to push costly, exquisite platforms built for yesterday’s wars.

Even US President Donald Trump recently criticized America’s drone cost structures, pointing to the disparity. “You look at these drones they’re sending in,” Trump said. “They’re good, they’re fast, and they’re deadly.” Better models already exist in allies like Israel and India.

India’s Operation Sindoor: A Blueprint for What Comes Next

India, too, offers a compelling model. In 2014, after its own moment of strategic introspection, New Delhi launched the “Make in India” initiative—reforming its defence sector around domestic production, self-reliance, and strategic speed. A decade later, that investment paid off in Operation Sindoor.

Operation Sindoor was more than a swift and precise military response to another cross-border terrorist attack. It marked a strategic inflection point.

In just four days, India used domestically developed systems to strike hardened targets across the border with precision, speed, and overwhelming effect.

No US systems. No foreign supply lines Just BrahMos missiles, Akashteer air defence units, and loitering munitions designed or assembled at home.

India’s overwhelming success demonstrated something more enduring than airpower. It validated a national defence doctrine built around efficient domestic industrial strength.

And most significantly, it delivered a clear message to its strategic rival. Pakistan—a Chinese proxy by armament, alignment, doctrine—was completely outmatched. Its (Pakistan) Chinese-made air defence systems could not stop, detect, or deter India’s precision strikes.

In Operation Sindoor, India didn’t just win. It demonstrated overwhelming military superiority against a Chinese-backed adversary.

The BrahMos missile—a supersonic cruise missile co-developed with Russia but now largely manufactured in India—costs approximately $4.85 million per unit. While more expensive than the older U.S. Tomahawk ($1 to $2.5 million, depending on the variant), BrahMos delivers unmatched speed and kinetic impact at nearly Mach 3—a distinct performance advantage.

Meanwhile, India’s Akashteer system—an AI-integrated airdefence control and reporting network—is being fielded at a fraction of the cost of U.S. systems like NASAMS or Patriot.

With a contract value of just $240 million for a full suite of integrated capabilities, Akashteer exemplifies India’s ability to deploy high-performance, scalable systems without the financial burdens typical of Western platforms.

Together, these investments reflect a strategic model built on capability, speed, and cost-efficiency—one the United States would do well to study.

India’s drone usage during OperationSindoor reinforced the point. The SkyStriker—an Israeli-developed loitering munition assembled domestically—and the Harop, a long-range autonomous loitering munition, proved critical to India’s ability to identify and strike key terrorist targets with precision.

This wasn’t theory. It was execution. These systems were not boutique prototypes—they were deployed, tested, and validated in a real war.

Meanwhile, Pakistani defences—built largely around older Chinese systems like the LY-80, HQ-9/P, and FM-90—were powerless to detect, deter, or respond to the strikes. In the skies over Pakistan, India didn’t just dominate. It redefined regional deterrence.

India has already moved from 30% to 65% domestic sourcing in defence capital procurement, with a goal of 90% by the decade’s end.

It increased capital outlays for domestic production from $6 billion in 2019-2020 to nearly $20 billion in 2023-24. It allowed up to 74% FDI in defence, bringing in foreign partners while building indigenous capacity.

India didn’t just talk about reform. It executed it. And it won.

India has become a master of the physics of lethality. The United States can learn from their success and model some of their changes for its own needs.

The Strategic Choice Before America

India’s success—and Ukraine’s innovation—should be a wake-up call. They are building the warfighting models of the future. The US is still operating with Cold War machinery and Gulf War assumptions.

The next war won’t give the US five years to prepare. It may not give the US five months. The lesson of Operation Sindoor is not just that India is rising—it’s that the United States can fall behind.

We cannot deter a war we are not prepared to fight. And the US cannot win a war it can’t afford, can’t scale, and can’t keep up with. The time for US defence reform is not coming. It’s already late.

From Ukraine to India, battlefield truths are being written in real time. The US must capture them not passively, but through deliberate collection, analysis, and integration into its own systems.

(With Inputs from Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA)