Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd)
New Delhi. When Russia launched its Special Operation against Ukraine in February 2022, it was expected that with its massive force level advantage, it would run through the country in a few days. That was not to be.
The main reason was Ukraine’s innovative use of air defence systems, and the massive material and physical support it received from the US and NATO. Far from Russia achieving air superiority, Ukraine created an environment which now is termed as “Air denial”.
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR); Direct Attack Munitions (DAMs); Uncrewed Systems; Secure Communications; and Air Defence defined the new norms for modernisation of militaries. Russia was forced to use expensive stand-off precision guided weapons and cruise missiles against targets that once could have been destroyed by much cheaper gravity iron-bombs.
Ground Based Air Defence
Ground-based Air Defence Systems (GBADS) protect army and air force bases, land-based fixed assets and mobile platforms from aerial threats such as combat aircraft, attack helicopters, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), incoming missiles, guided munitions, and rockets. Advanced air defence requires radars and other electro-optical sensors for early threat detection; surface-to-air weapons; command and control systems for air defence networks, and critical infrastructure protection systems.
Air bases, strategic assets, critical military infrastructures and other land-based mobile platforms rely on layered air defence systems for all-round protection against modern symmetric and asymmetric threats, including small, high-speed aerial targets. Furthermore, modern self-propelled mobile AD systems protect vital stationary assets, including mechanised forces and convoys of the militaries. Mobility means ‘Shoot and Scoot’ and brings own safety. Cheaper Man-Portable Missiles (MANPADS) have proved very effective.
‘Layered air defence’ usually refers to multiple ‘tiers’ of air defence systems which, when combined, an airborne threat must penetrate in order to reach its target through combined use of systems optimized for either short-, medium-, or long-range air defence.
Russian Aerospace Force Failures
Despite massive offensive capability of the Russian Aerospace Force (VKS), they showed clear limitations and somewhat lacklustre performance. It failed to gain air superiority, was unable to sufficiently degrade Ukrainian ground-based air defences, could not carry out deep interdiction attacks against Ukrainian military targets and was unable to provide adequate fire support to frontline ground forces. They had not anticipated determined resistance from Ukrainian GBADS), bolstered by Europe and the United States.
VKS lost nearly 20 percent of the initial strength of the Sukhoi Su-34 fighter ground-attack fleet, the highest attrition rate across all its aircraft types. The Su-25 ground-attack losses were also significant. Russia also suffered heavy rotor-wing losses, particularly among Ka-52 Hokum attack helicopters. The VKS’s underperformance in Ukraine has also illustrated its gap in special-mission aircraft. Russia has a dearth of ISR as well as electronic-warfare and jamming aircraft. Russia should have realised that Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) cannot be half-hearted.
The attrition among fighter aircraft caused Russia to rely more heavily on long-range aviation that operated farther from Ukrainian air defences, and relied on land-attack cruise-missiles. The sporadic nature of the attacks reflected supply constraints of the long-range Raduga Kh-101 missile that replaced the Kh-25/Kh-27, as well as Russia’s desire to conserve its precision-strike resources for a potential campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. The VKS also employed some tactical weapons including at least one variant of the Kh-38M, as well as the Grom glide bomb.
The Russian industrial complex had not anticipated a long war but did accelerated aircraft and weapon production though. The focus is currently short-term. In fact, rather unbelievably, Russia was forced to turn abroad to meet equipment needs. For instance, Iran is providing Moscow with some UAVs and DAMs. North Korea has supplied up to 1,000 containers of equipment and munitions.
Ukrainian Air Defence Systems
In 1992 the newly independent Ukraine took over control of the three AD Corps stationed in Ukraine and retained the Air Defence Forces of Ukraine as a separate armed service, equal in status to the Ground Forces, Air Forces and the Navy.
Ukraine, the largest of the Soviet Union constituents, inherited a significant inventory of aircraft and systems after the Soviet split. But Ukraine lost nearly 50 of the 100 fighter aircraft in the initial months, mostly on the ground. Ukraine also had Soviet/Russian AD systems such as S-300 (SA-11), the Buk (SA-10), S-125 Neva/Pechora, and 2K12 Kub, self-propelled, medium-range SAMs. They has Strella and Igla Infrared homing MANPADS.
Western AD System Transfers
Air-defence equipment featured heavily in the NATO transfers.
As per the Military Balance 2024, some of the major systems included IRIS-T SLM Medium-range SAMs, Skynex 35mm self-propelled air defence artillery, TRML-3D Air-surveillance Radars from Germany, Batteries of NASAMS Medium-range AD system, and Vampire Point-defence SAM funded by USA; MR-2 Viktor 14.5mm self-propelled air defence artillery from the Netherlands; Terrahawk Paladin 35mm self-propelled air defence artillery from UK, Counter UAV systems from Australia, Belgium Mistral launchers, AIM-120 for NASAMS, and RIM-7 Sea Sparrow for SAM systems, Canada’s battery of NASAMS and significant numbers of AIM-120 AMRAAMs, AIM-9s, AIM-7 beyond-visual-range missiles, Finland’s AA guns, French SAMP/T battery, two Crotale NG batteries, and a complete short-range air defence system, and Israel’s anti-drone systems, Ukraine has everything.
The list is unending, and most significant, there is the will to fight beck.
Many NATO countries, Denmark included, will be transferring F-16 aircraft in 2024. Ukraine has already received over 2,000 US-made shoulder-fired Stinger missiles while Bulgaria has supported repair of non-functional S-300 missiles in Ukraine.
The bolstered Ukrainian air defences were able to limit Russian combat-aircraft operations over the front line, but have struggled however to keep pace with the barrage of cruise missiles, UAVs, DAMs and high-speed weapons launched by Russia.
Kyiv’s Innovative Use of AD Systems
Kyiv continues to innovate weapons technology. Ukraine halted Russia’s attempt to seize the capital Kyiv by causing unacceptable losses to Russian air strike aircraft. Western space based ISR, secure communications, command and control support (AEW&C) helped in early warning and quick AD response.
Western AD systems have allowed full AD bubble cover, and there has been intensive training for Ukrainians.
Ukraine camouflaged the AD systems well. Also it followed “shoot & scoot” tactics to prevent exposing location. Ukraine thus established what is called “Air Denial” over its territory, forcing Russia to use expensive stand-off weapons. Russia also used over a dozen hypersonic weapons, but their military impact was questionable. Claims that American AD systems neutralized Kinzhal hypersonic missile are also being questioned. In the long-term MANPADS are not enough, LR-SAMs are required.
Ukraine has manage better dispersal of assets after the initial months.
Notably, UAVs/drones have democratized air power. Ukraine has used loitering munitions very effectively. Meanwhile, the counter-drone success rate has gone up to nearly 60 percent. But anti-drone systems to take on large saturating drone swarms are needed.
Significantly again, Ukraine has managed to create creative disruptions, including in cyber domain.
Lessons from Israel’s Ongoing Conflicts
Israel has been fighting against Hamas and Houthis, both of which have no air force but significant drones and Surface to Surface Missiles (SSM). Hamas has made innovative use of “Motor Gliders”. Israel’s intelligence failure has clearly
AD Lessons for India
Ballistic missiles follow a high-altitude predictable trajectory, and are detectable by radar. Drones fly at a very low altitude like a slow-moving cruise missile, making them very difficult to detect. Drones are difficult to intercept until the drones have come uncomfortably close.
India has a reasonably good radar cover for ballistic missile early warning. But Indian forces have to develop an edge over evolving technologies in Radars, Infrared and acoustic sensors for detecting drones and cruise missiles. Airborne Early Warning and Control systems (AEW&C) may detect large drones, but due to the limited number of these assets in the Indian Air Force (IAF) inventory, there are limitations. Nonetheless, India’s AD radars are well networked and comprehensive air picture is available through IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS).
Developing advanced Directed energy Weapons (DEW) is the needed option. “Iron Beam” is an Israeli DEW. DEWs are still evolving, and there are complexities related to atmospheric conditions and also ability to point at the target accurately. Yet typically the cost of each interception is negligible. As little as $2,000 per shot to cover all costs, against $150,000 per interceptor missile.
India will have to fight conventional military forces in a highly contested , network centric, peer capable environment. It will face integrated and networked air-to-air, surface-to-air, space and cyberspace threats, with advanced fighter aircraft, sensors, and weapons.
Future wars will require exploiting air and space together. Crewed-Uncrewed Teaming, DEWs, a Cyber Force with sophisticated Electronic Warfare capability, all are required. Also sophisticated is required. Undoubtedly India needs much more AD systems and the capacity to build more missiles and also have surge production capability. There is a need to hasten indigenous programmes and production, and build future proof industrial capability.
