By R Anil Kumar
Bengaluru. The Report published in Foreign Affairs on January 16, 2026, serves as a stark warning about the deteriorating US-India strategic partnership under Donald Trump’s second administration.
It traces the historical evolution of bilateral ties from post-independence suspicion to a robust alliance forged over 25 years, only to highlight recent frictions that now threaten this progress.
India’s early distrust of the United States stemmed from perceptions of Washington as an imperial successor to European powers. During the Cold War, New Delhi pursued nonalignment, frequently criticising US actions. The post-Soviet era marked a turning point, as American leaders recognised India’s potential as a counterweight to China’s rise and a lucrative market.
Bipartisan US efforts, spanning Democratic and Republican administrations, involved persistent diplomacy, defence agreements, and technology transfers. Indian governments gradually reciprocated, leading to deepened economic links and military pacts. By January 2025, when Trump returned to the White House, relations stood stronger than at any point in the twentieth century.
Trouble erupted over the brief India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025. Trump claimed credit for brokering its end, a narrative embraced by Islamabad, which lauded his “decisive diplomatic intervention” and even nominated him for a Nobel Peace Prize. New Delhi rejected this outright, adhering to its longstanding principle against third-party mediation in disputes with Pakistan.
Tensions escalated when Trump hosted Pakistan’s military chief, General Syed Asim Munir, in the Oval Office shortly after Pakistani terrorists killed 26 people in Indian-administered Kashmir—sparking the very conflict in question. This move deeply offended India.
Trump further strained ties by refusing a bilateral trade deal, imposing severe tariffs on Indian exports to the US, and publicly labelling India a “dead economy” in August 2025. In response, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China—his first trip there in seven years—and was photographed in amicable poses with Chinese and Russian leaders.
Trump’s retort was to declare that the United States had “lost India.” Yet the authors argue the partnership is not irretrievably broken. Official channels continue to function amid the leadership feud, with ongoing cooperation in defence and other areas.
To arrest the decline, the Trump administration must act decisively: slash tariffs on Indian goods, retract claims of mediating the India-Pakistan ceasefire, and cease offers to arbitrate the decades-old Kashmir dispute. These steps challenge Trump’s obsessions with trade deficits and personal accolades, but they are essential.
India’s status as a “global swing state” underscores its pivotal role. Its choices will shape the international order, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where it aligns with US worries over Chinese expansionism and champions democratic resilience.
The Report emphasises that New Delhi remains a vital US partner. Losing it would be a strategic catastrophe for Washington, especially as Indo-Pacific democracies require unity to counterbalance Beijing’s ambitions.
Looking back, Indian policymakers initially welcomed Trump’s 2025 return. His first term had prioritised ties with the world’s most populous democracy, elevating defence cooperation and integrating India into the Indo-Pacific strategy.
Personal chemistry between Trump and Modi flourished, evidenced by high-profile events like the 2017 White House dinner and massive rallies—”Howdy Modi” in Texas (2019) and “Namaste Trump” in Gujarat (2020)—drawing tens of thousands.
New Delhi anticipated continuity. Instead, presidential pique unravelled these gains, plunging relations into a downward spiral that demands urgent US corrective action.
This piece arrives at a critical juncture, mere hours after publication on 16 January 2026, amid India’s own geopolitical sensitivities. As a defence analyst tracking Indo-Pacific dynamics, one notes how Trump’s tariff aggression echoes his first-term “America First” playbook, clashing with India’s self-reliant economic push under Atmanirbhar Bharat.
India’s refusal of mediation aligns with its strategic autonomy doctrine, a non-negotiable red line since 1947. Hosting General Munir post-Kashmir attack risks alienating not just India but the Quad framework (US, India, Japan, Australia), which hinges on shared threat perceptions vis-à-vis Pakistan-backed terrorism.
PM Modi’s China visit signals pragmatic hedging, not abandonment of the West. Beijing’s overtures come amid border tensions (Galwan 2020 onwards), yet India’s QUAD commitments and IPEF participation affirm its westward tilt—provided Washington reciprocates.
From an Indian defence perspective, tariff relief would unlock supply chain integration, vital for indigenous production in missiles, UAVs, and avionics. Persistent friction could pivot Delhi towards Russia (S-400s) or France (Rafales), diluting US tech transfers like GE F414 engines for Tejas Mk2.
Kashmir mediation offers are particularly tone-deaf; they ignore India’s constitutional integration of Jammu & Kashmir post-Article 370 abrogation in 2019. US retreat here would rebuild trust, enabling deeper iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology) collaboration on semiconductors and AI.
Broader Indo-Pacific stability hangs in balance. India’s Andaman-Nicobar bases and Malabar exercises amplify US deterrence against PLAN aggression in the South China Sea. A “lost India” emboldens Xi Jinping, undermining AUKUS and Quad efficacy.
Trump’s Nobel fixation, while politically savvy domestically, misreads New Delhi’s playbook. India’s multipolar worldview prioritises bilateralism over great-power arbitration, much like its Ukraine stance—principled neutrality amid Russian arms dependence.
Economic levers offer quick wins: rescinding tariffs could revive $500 billion bilateral trade potential, fostering US FDI in India’s defence corridor (e.g., Uttar Pradesh hubs for BrahMos, Akash missiles).
Restoration demands maturity from both sides. PM Modi could leverage SCO or G20 forums to signal continuity with Washington, while Trump pivots from rhetoric to results — like fast-tracking MQ-9B Reaper sales for Indian Navy P-8I synergy.
Failure risks a self-fulfilling prophecy. As CNAS leaders, Fontaine and Curtis — drawing from NSC tenures—speak with authority: salvage now, or forfeit a counter-China bulwark in humanity’s most populous democracy. For India’s strategic community, this underscores the perils of personalised diplomacy in a volatile neighbourhood.
(Based on Foreign Affairs Report)
